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Article
On Slippery Constitutional Slopes and the
Affordable Care Act
STEWART JAY
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is one of the most
significant laws ever passed by Congress. It is aimed at a social problem
of the first order, the spiraling costs of health care and the millions of
Americans without health insurance. The new law has engendered an
enormous amount of public discussion and likely will be a major issue in
the upcoming national elections. At the center of the controversy is the
keystone of the Act: a mandate that almost all Americans obtain a
minimum amount of health insurance or be assessed a penalty when
paying their income taxes.
Lawsuits have been brought challenging the constitutionality of the
mandate on numerous grounds. One of these cases, brought by twenty-six
states and private plaintiffs, is pending before the Supreme Court and may
very well be a landmark decision. Plaintiffs claim that Congress does not
have power under Article I to impose the requirement.
There are two possible Article I bases for upholding the mandate: the
Commerce Clause and the taxation provisions of the General Welfare
Clause. Opponents deny that these are valid grounds. Their primary
argument is that the Act either regulates or taxes inactivity and that
allowing such a measure would give Congress limitless power to legislate.
Further, if the mandate constitutes a tax under Article L it must be an
unapportioned "direct tax, " which the Constitution prohibits.
This Article examines these challenges and others in detail. It
concludes that the mandate can be justified under both the Commerce
Clause (as augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause) and the
General Welfare Clause.
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From a certain perspective, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act of 2010 ("ACA") "poses one of the gravest challenges to republican
self-government since the Civil War . . [by] establish[ing] a vast array of
new entitlements, cost controls, and regulations over the health sector that
comprises one-sixth of the U.S. economy."' More colorfully still, others
claim that if the Act is sustained, "government would become Hobbes'
Leviathan.",2 Yet many see the ACA as "the most important progressive
legislation in decades,"3 and dismiss arguments that it exceeds Congress'
constitutional authority under Article I as "silly," thinly disguised efforts to
infuse the Constitution with libertarian principles.4
The main lawsuit against the Act, brought by twenty-six states and
private plaintiffs, seems to many a partisan effort to achieve through
litigation what the political process failed to accomplish. Opponents of the
ACA have been castigated for employing the same types of arguments that
underlay Lochner v. New York and Hammer v. Dagenhart.5 It is suspicious
Professor of Law & William L. Dwyer Chair in Law, University of Washington School of Law.
lEric R. Claeys, Obamacare and the Limits of Judicial Conservatism, 8 NAT'L AFF. 56, 56.
(2011).
2 Kenneth T. Cuccinelli et al., Why the Debate over the Constitutionality of the Federal Health
Care Law is About Much More than Health Care, 15 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 293, 335 (2011).
3 Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers: The Obvious Constitutionality of Health Care
Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1, 2 (2011), http://yalelawjoumal.org/the-yale-law-joumal-pocket-
part/constitutional-law/bad-news-for-mail-robbers:-the-obvious-constitutionality-of-health-care-reform.
4 Id. at 22 ("What really drives the constitutional claims against the bill is not arguments about the
commerce power or the taxing power but an implicit libertarianism which focuses on the burden a law
imposes on individuals and pays no attention at all to legitimate state interests."); see also Richard
Primus, Commentary, How the Gun-Free School Zones Act Saved the Individual Mandate, 110 MICH.
L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 44, 44 (2012), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/articles/how-the-gun-
free-school-zones-act-saved-the-individual-mandate ("Under existing doctrine, the provision is as valid
as can be.").
5 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 269, 277 (1918) (holding that a federal limitation on child
labor exceeded Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,
61, 64 (1905) (holding that limiting the working hours of bakers infringed on "liberty of contract" in
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); see, e.g., Ian Millhiser, Worse than
Lochner, 29 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. INTER ALIA 50 (2011) (comparing the arguments attacking the
constitutionality of the ACA to the policy arguments made during the time of Hammer and Lochner),
http://yalelawandpolicy.org/sites/default/files/YLPRIA29 Millhiser.pdf; Peter J. Smith, Federalism,
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to them that almost all the attorneys general or governors supporting the
litigation are Republicans. 6  Moreover, the attacks on the most
controversial feature of the Act, the mandate that almost all Americans
ineligible for government-provided medical care or employer-based
insurance plans must purchase insurance, strike more than a few as
hypocritical. The idea for this feature originated in conservative think
tanks and was first enacted in Massachusetts at the urging of a Republican
governor.7 If the extraordinarily lengthy oral arguments in the Supreme
Court over the constitutionality of the mandate result in derailing President
Obama's signature legislative achievement, it would, in the minds of
many, be a replay of the now-regretted decisions interrin g central
provisions of New Deal legislation as well as Bush v. Gore redux.
Although the ACA is an immensely complex piece of legislation, the
constitutional attack mainly concerns two of its key components: (1) the
insurance mandate,9 and (2) the expansion of Medicaid eligibility to cover
the "near-poor."' 0 This paper will treat only the first claim.
To many observers in the legal academy, this writer included, the
constitutional objections to the insurance mandate seem exceptionally
weak under the Court's approach to congressional powers since 1937.
However, some of us who were in the business of constitutional
prognostication prior to the Court's decisions in United States v. Lopez"
and United States v. Morrison2 view the current proceedings with a
sinking feeling that our confidence may be every bit as mistaken as it was
prior to those historic rulings limiting the scope of congressional power
Lochner, and the Individual Mandate, 91 B.U. L. REv. 1723, 1726 (2011) ("But because the objections
to the individual mandate, though couched in federalism terms, have very little to do with federalism at
all, it is difficult to see them as anything other than Lochner under a different guise.").
6 See Linda Greenhouse, Never Before, OPINIONATOR (Mar. 21, 2012, 9:00PM),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/2 1/never-before (noting that the lawsuit against the ACA
is brought by Republican governors or attorneys general in 26 states).
7 The government's brief on the mandate before the Supreme Court notes that the insurance
mandate was originally the idea of health economists and lawyers at the Heritage Foundation and the
American Enterprise Institute. Brief for the Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Provision) at 14-15,
Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, No. 11-398 (Jan. 6, 2012).
8 See Koppelman, supra note 3, at I ("The Supreme Court may be headed for its most dramatic
intervention in American politics-and most flagrant abuse of its power--since Bush v. Gore."); David
Orentlicher, Response, Constitutional Challenges to the Health Care Mandate: Based in Politics, Not
Law, 160 U. PA. L. REv. PENNUMBRA 19, 32 n.52 (2011), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/09-
201 l/Orentlicher.pdf (noting that invalidating the ACA would require "a special rule.., it would not
be the first time that the Court took such a path. Recall Bush v. Gore . .
9 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West 2003 and Supp. 2011).
'o See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396A(A)(10)(a)(i)(VIII) (West 2003 & Supp. 2011) (requiring that starting
in 2004 state Medicaid plans must cover individuals whose family income does not exceed 133% of the
poverty line).
" 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
12 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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under the Commerce Clause. 13 Many of us had told our students that as a
practical matter the only limits to national legislation were political, and
our confidence did not seem misplaced. After all, the Court had time and
again since 1937 consistently approved expanding uses of the Commerce
Clause to support congressional action. The one major effort by the Court
to wall off the states from federal legislation was National League of Cities
v. Usery14 in 1976 and its progeny, which had attempted to delineate areas
in which state sovereignty was supreme by virtue of the Tenth Amendment
regardless of whether Congress was acting within its powers under Article
1.15 That effort ended decisively nine years later in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority,16 which eviscerated National League of
Cities, instilling an "I-told-you-so" feeling of vindication among those who
thought the Court had interred the Tenth Amendment a generation earlier
in United States v. Darby.7 In Darby, the Court famously pronounced the
Tenth Amendment to be a mere "truism" that imposed no constraints on
federal power that was otherwise within Article I's ambit.18 Seven years
after Garcia, however, the Court shocked us again by resurrecting state
sovereignty as an independent force in New York v. United States,
19
followed by Printz v. United States in 1997.20 While not disavowing
Darby, the Court in those cases discovered a new limit to federal authority
in "the structure of the Constitution, '  namely "the principle of state
sovereignty, ' '22 which forbade Congress from "commandeering" 23 the
states into enacting or administering laws even if the statute could be
justified under Article I. And then came Lopez and Morrison, the first
decisions in nearly sixty years to hold that Congress had overreached its
authority in enacting laws based on the Commerce Clause.24
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
14 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985).
's See id. at 852 ("We hold that insofar as the challenged amendments operate to directly displace
the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, they
are not within the authority grated Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.").
16 Garcia, 469 U.S. 528.
"7 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
18 Id. at 124 ("The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been
surrendered.").
'9 505 U.S. 144 (1992)
o 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
2' Id. at 918.
22 Id. at 924.
23 Id. at 914; New York, 505 U.S. at 175.
24 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557
(1995); see also New York, 505 U.S. at 166. ("[E]ven where Congress has the authority under the
Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the
States to require or prohibit those acts .... [T]he Commerce Clause, for example, authorizes Congress
2012]
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Once upon a time, when I was a lad and working as a law clerk for
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, another clerk and I spent much of an
afternoon arguing with the Chief about a pending case involving
government tort liability for catastrophic disasters at nuclear power plants.
We were fresh from legal educations that highly valued the ability to ferret
out tensions between decisions, and we concluded that there was an
insurmountable obstacle to the Court even reaching the merits in Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.25 We thought it
clear from the Court's precedents that an environmental group and its
members lacked standing to contest the validity of an act that would only
become operative if an unlikely event occurred, a catastrophic accident at a
nuclear plant. (This was before the sobering lesson of Three Mile Island.)
After listening to us carefully and only gently parrying our seemingly
irrefutable position, the Chief gave us a bemused look and said: "You boys
want too much consistency." He explained that the decision over the
constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act already effectively had been
made "in another place," cocking his thumb in the direction of the capitol
building. Congress had made the choice, he said, back when we were
scarcely out of diapers, to develop nuclear power using private business.
Weighing of risks and benefits from nuclear power was the prerogative-
and responsibility-of the politicians across the street, in Burger's view.
The liability cap reflected Congress' conclusion that without it no company
would assume such a risk. As it happened, however, a federal district
judge had invalidated the Act on due process and equal protection
grounds,26 holdings which struck the Chief as plainly crazy. Dismissing
the case for standing would, of course, overturn that result as a matter of
law, but nonetheless, the industry could be stifled just by knowing that a
federal court had found the liability limit unconstitutional. It was essential,
Burger thought, to reach the merits and undo the damage. And so the
opinion was written finding standing on a previously unrecognized basis
27
21
and overturning the lower court's judgment on the merits. What we
clerks had forgotten was that this was the Supreme Court, and the justices
could make up new rules and stretch venerable doctrines like elastic.
And so it is with the ACA. Whatever the professoriate might think,
and regardless of the seeming clarity of existing law, it would be rather
to regulate interstate commerce directly; it does not authorize Congress to regulate state governments'
regulation of interstate commerce.").
25 Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
26 Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 431 F. Supp. 203, 222-25
(W.D.N.C. 1977), rev'dsub nom. Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
27 Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 81; see also Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty as a Basis for
Standing, 33 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1123, 1124-25 (2005) ("Scholars ...have tended to view [Duke
Power] as an example of the manipulation of standing doctrine to obtain a desired outcome.").
" Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 93-94.
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simple to write a plausible opinion hollowing out the core of the Act by
invalidating the insurance mandate. After all, several federal judges have
done just that, including the majority on an Eleventh Circuit panel 29-and
they did not even have the luxury of overtly changing the rules. Nor
should one think that in doing so these judges did not regard themselves as
acting lawlessly, but rather thought they were fully justified by stare
decisis. What follows here, then, is not a prediction, but rather a view of
the central issues concerning the constitutionality of the ACA mandate that
the Court is confronting as it decides the case. True, the Act should
survive with ease, but the same was forecasted about the statutes
invalidated in Lopez and Morrison.
II. THE DILEMMA OF HEALTH INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES
For a variety of reasons, the United States has a distressingly
inadequate system for providing medical services to its people. Despite the
creation of Medicare to guarantee coverage to older Americans, and
Medicaid to serve many of the poor, some fifty million Americans lacked
any type of medical insurance when the ACA was passed, and the number
grows each year.30  The main barrier to accomplishing near-universal
insurance has been cost. Unless a person who is ineligible for Medicare or
Medicaid works for an employer offering a group insurance plan, the only
alternative is the individual market, where policies are unaffordable or
unavailable to millions.3' Those with preexisting medical conditions often
are hit with higher premiums than healthy patients, refused coverage for
those conditions, or denied insurance altogether.32 In 2010, more than nine
million Americans with preexisting conditions found that they could not
obtain coverage on the individual market-at least not without paying
substantially higher premiums than healthy enrollees or having their
preexisting medical issues excluded from coverage.33 Sixty percent of
29 Florida ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1311-12
(1 I th Cir. 2011) (holding that the individual mandate provision of the ACA exceeds Congress' power
under the Commerce Clause).
30 CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN
THE UNITED STATES: 2009 23 tbl.8 (2010), http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/p60-238.pdf. In
2010, twenty-eight percent of "working-age adults, an estimated 52 million people, were uninsured for
at least some time during 2010, up from 38 million or 24% in 2001." SARA R. COLLINS ET AL., THE
COMMONWEALTH FUND, HELP ON THE HORIZON: How THE RECESSION HAS LEFT MILLIONS OF
WORKERS WITHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE, AND How HEALTH REFORM WILL BRING RELIEF at xi, xii
exhibit ES-3 (2011), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/-/media/Files/Surveys/2011/1486_Collins_
helpon the horizon 2010 biennial surveyreportFINAL_31611 .pdf.
31 COLLINS ET AL., supra note 30, at 1.
32 Id. at 4.
33 
Id. at xi; see also CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, KEY ISSUES IN ANALYZING MAJOR
HEALTH INSURANCE PROPOSALS 80-81 (2008), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/99xx/doc9924/12-18-
Keylssues.pdf ("According to a 2005 study, about 70 percent of applicants for individual coverage are
2012] 1139
CONNECTICUT LA WREVIEW
adults-sixteen million people-who sought "coverage in the individual
market found it very difficult or impossible to find a plan they could
afford. 3
4
Nor were there any signs prior to passage of the ACA that the situation
would improve if the health insurance industry was left to its own devices.
Insurance companies for decades had secured their profits in the individual
market by limiting enrollment to predictably healthy people. Moreover, it
had been proven unworkable for states to require insurers to offer coverage
of those with preexisting conditions on the same terms as healthy patients.
Seven states tried to do so, only to find that many people waited until they
became seriously ill or suffered an accident requiring expensive care to
purchase insurance.35 In all of these states, premiums for health insurance
soared or insurers withdrew from the market.36 The individual actions that
produced this consequence may have been rational as people calculated
that they were better off not obtaining insurance except when their medical
expenses exceeded the cost of premiums. Collectively, however, their
choices were disastrous to the stability and affordability of the system.
The Congressional Budget Office ("CBO") projected that another four
million people would lack insurance by 2019 if reforms were not enacted.37
Those without insurance and unable to pay out of pocket for health
services or through a government program such as Medicaid or Medicare
have not been entirely unable to obtain care. For humanitarian reasons,
health care providers are required by state and federal law to provide
essential care to those in a medical emergency or active labor, regardless of
whether the patients are insured or otherwise capable of paying their
bills.38 The result has been that uninsured or underinsured patients seek
quoted a standard rate based only on their age; about 20 percent are either charged a higher premium
(generally not exceeding twice the standard rate for their age group) or are sold a modified package that
does not cover treatments for their preexisting health conditions (at least for some period of time); and
about 10 percent are denied coverage.").
' COLLINS ET AL., supra note 30, at x.
35 See Brief for Am. Ass'n of People with Disabilities, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 8-9, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs. v. Florida, No. 11-398 (Jan. 11, 2012)
("Kentucky, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Vermont, and Washington enacted
legislation that required insurers to guarantee issue to all consumers in the individual market, but did
not have a minimum coverage provision .... All of these laws had detrimental effects on the insurance
markets in those states.").
36 See id. at 9 ("All seven states suffered from skyrocketing insurance premium costs, reductions
in individuals with coverage, and reductions in insurance products and providers.").
37 KEY ISSUES IN ANALYZING MAJOR HEALTH INSURANCE PROPOSALS, supra note 33, at ix
(2008) ("CBO estimates that the average number of nonelderly people who are uninsured will rise from
at least 45 million in 2009 to about 54 million in 2019.").
38 See Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006) (enacted
in 1986, mandating that hospitals offering emergency services accepting Medicare reimbursements
must provide stabilizing emergency care to those unable to pay for the services); H.R. REP. No. 99-241,
pt. 3, at 5 (1985) ("[A]t least 22 states have enacted statutes or issued regulations requiring the
[Vol. 44:1133
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treatment at hospital emergency rooms, which are obliged to at least screen
them and stabilize their conditions, regardless of inability to pay.39 Apart
from emergencies, physicians and hospitals also commonly provide
extensive care without first demanding payment, only to find the patient
incapable of compensating them. These debts often are uncollectable
because the person has inadequate assets or declares bankruptcy.40
Congress made a formal finding in the Act that over sixty percent "of all
personal bankruptcies are caused in part by medical expenses. 'A In
addition to emergency care, publicly-subsidized "community health
centers" exist in every state, providing "a wide range of basic health
services to all patients in need, regardless of their ability to pay.',42 These
centers provide "the medical home to 20 million Americans, 5% of the
current U.S. population.,
43
When patients cannot pay what frequently are astronomically high
bills, the tab often is absorbed by providers, who in turn raise prices for
their paying patients to recover the loss.44 Insurers then must reimburse
providers for these charges, which ultimately are reflected in higher costs
for insurance premiums.45 In 2008, those without insurance consumed
$119 billion in health care expenses, but providers were stuck with forty-
three billion dollars in unpaid medical bills.46 Congress found that "[t]his
cost-shifting increases family premiums by on average over $1,000 a
provision of limited medical services whenever an emergency situation exists, and.., many state court
rulings impose a common law duty on doctors and hospitals to provide necessary emergency
care .. "),
39 Reed Abelson, Uninsured Put a Strain on Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2008, at B 1.
4See COLLINS El AL., supra note 30, at 10 ("129 million adults) used all of their savings because
of their medical bills.... 7 million adults[] reported that medical bills caused them to take out a loan or
a mortgage against their home, and another 4 million had to declare bankruptcy.").
4' 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(G) (West 2003 & Supp. 2011). The amount owed by an individual
also could be too small to pursue via legal action, even though the sum of uncollected accounts from
numerous absconding patients is considerable. See Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, Free Rider: A
Justification for Mandatory Medical Insurance Under Health Care Reform?, 109 MICH. L. REv. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 78, 81 (2011), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/109/kahn.pdf. ("As to why
the medical providers sometimes do not enforce collection from those who have the means but do not
pay, it is likely that in most cases the amount involved is too small to justify the cost of pursuing
collection.").
42 Brief of 104 Health Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Minimum
Coverage Provision) at 11, United States Dep't Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, No. 11-398 (Jan.
11, 2012).
43 Eli Y. Adashi et al., Health Care Reform and Primary Care -The Growing Importance of the
Community Health Center, 362 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2047, 2047 (June 3, 2010),
http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10. 1056/NEJMp-l 003729.
44FAMILIES USA, HIDDEN HEALTH TAX: AMERICANS PAY A PREMIUM 2 (2009),
http://familiesusa2.org/assets/pdfs/hidden-health-tax.pdf.
45 Id.
46 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(F).
2012]
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year.' '47  Without regulatory intervention, the problem will only grow
worse because the underlying forces are self-reinforcing: higher premiums
make insurance harder to afford, and those forced out of the market in turn
incur medical expenses they cannot meet, which then contributes to rising
premium rates. The exclusion of preexisting conditions from coverage
adds another twist. Once such people drop insurance due to the high cost,
it usually is impossible for them to reenter the individual market and
procure coverage for their chronic health problems.48
Notwithstanding these problems, the system for paying medical costs
might be justified if it resulted in decent care for most Americans. The
United States spends more for medical services than any other country, and
the costs have been increasing inexorably.49  In 2010, health care
consumed $2.6 trillion in the United States, a staggering 17.9% of gross
domestic product, or $8402 per person.50 This reflected a rise of 3.9% in
2010, which followed a 3.8% rise the year before-and these were the
lowest rates of annual growth in over fifty years.51 Congress estimated that
without reform in the system total spending on health care would rise to an
astonishing $4.7 trillion annually by 2019.52 The actual results of medical
treatment for patients often have been startlingly inferior to those of other
countries that spend far less per capita on health care.53 In part, this is due
to the way health care is financed in this country. Two out of five adults in
2010, or seventy-five million Americans, reported that "because of the
cost, they had not been able to get needed care, including not going to the
doctor when they were sick, not filling a prescription, skipping a
recommended test, treatment, or follow-up visit, or not getting needed
specialist care. 54 Those with inadequate insurance coverage are less likely
to obtain preventive services and more prone to waiting until their
conditions become severe and complicated to treat. They also tend to
47 Id.
48 See Coverage Denied: How the Current Health Insurance System Leaves Millions Behind, U.S.
DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Feb. 27, 2012, 8:23 PM), http://www.healthre-
form.gov/reports/deniedcoverage/index.html ("In 45 states across the country, insurance companies
can discriminate against people based on their pre-existing conditions when they try to purchase health
insurance directly from insurance companies in the individual insurance market.").49 See Reed Abelson, While the U.S. Spends Heavily on Health Care, a Study Faults the Quality,
N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2008, at C3 (stating that the United States has the most expensive medical care in
the world but ranks last among industrialized nations in preventing deaths through preventive medicine,
while medical costs continue to rise).
50 National Health Expenditures 2010 Highlights, CTRS. FOR MEDICAID & MEDICARE SERVS.,
www.cms.gov/Nationa[HealthExpendData/downloads/highlights.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
51 Id
2 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(B).
53 See KEY ISSUES IN ANALYZING MAJOR HEALTH INSURANCE PROPOSALS, supra note 33, at ix
("[D]espite spending more per capita than other countries, the United States lags behind lower-
spending countries on several metrics, including life expectancy and infant mortality."); supra note 49.
54 COLLINS ET AL., supra note 30, at xiii.
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access the system through expensive emergency services, which were not
designed to care for patients with chronic conditions.5"
Any national solution to the shortcomings of the American approach
must address all of these issues as part of a comprehensive package: the
inadequacy of insurance, the rising costs of health care, and the quality of
services. As the experience of the seven states shows, merely mandating
that insurers accept all applicants without regard to preexisting conditions
leads to a "death spiral" in the individual market.56 Allowing people to
delay obtaining insurance until they are sick or injured distorts the pool of
insured patients. If everyone has insurance, however, the risk population
includes healthier, generally younger people who on average will need less
care than older people and those with expensive, chronic conditions.
One way to resolve this dilemma would be for Congress to create a
national single-payer system, financed by mandatory tax assessments. In
short, it would expand Medicare to all Americans by using Congress'
powers under Article I to tax and spend for the national welfare. Congress
also could use the Commerce Clause to mandate that providers accept
reimbursement through the system as payment in full for services. Neither
of these steps would be unconstitutional. Health care involves the delivery
of services for compensation, a form of commerce, and does so through the
channels of interstate commerce using the instrumentalities of commerce.
For obvious political reasons, however, these solutions are foreclosed.
Congress realized that reforms would have to be built on the existing
system of private insurance and providers who are free to refuse patients
unable to pay.
III. A SUMMARY OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
The Act pursues a variety of means to expand coverage to more
Americans while lowering the cost of insurance. One way it accomplishes
this end is by broadening Medicaid to cover those with incomes up to
133% of the federally-defined poverty line, which obliges the states as
''partners" in the program to spend billions more to pay for the expanded
rolls.5 7  The Act also calls for creating government-sponsored health
insurance "exchanges" that would allow individuals to pool together with
55 See Nicholas Bagley & Jill R. Horwitz, Commentary, Why It's Called the Affordable Care Act,
110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 1, 4-5 (2011), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/
assets/fil/ I0/bagleyhorwitz.pdf (noting that the uninsured tend to receive acute medical care in the
emergency room, rather than through more cost effective mechanisms).
56 See Making Health Care Work for American Families: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Health of the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 111th Cong. 10 (2009) ("It is well known that
community-rating and guaranteed issue coupled with voluntary insurance tends to lead to a death spiral
of individual insurance.").
" 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VillI) (West 2003 & Supp. 2011).
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others to secure rates more in line with employer-based plans.58 Those
whose household incomes are under 400% of the poverty line will be
eligible for tax credits toward purchasing insurance via these exchanges.59
Small businesses likewise are offered tax credits and access to insurance
60
exchanges to encourage them to provide employees with coverage.
Large companies, on the other hand, will be hit with greater tax liability if
they fail to offer policies deemed adequate by Congress.6'
The insurance market itself will be regulated much more extensively
by the ACA. Insurers are no longer allowed to impose lifetime ceilings on
insurance reimbursements.62 Starting in 2014, they will be unable to deny
coverage to persons with preexisting medical conditions, or charge higher
rates to reflect the relative medical costs of such individuals. 63 Insurance
cannot be terminated for any reason other than fraud or misrepresenta-
tion.64 Plans offered to families must continue to cover children until age
twenty-six if requested. 65  To help reduce costs, insurers will be required
to limit their profits and administrative expenses in order to spend
prescribed percentages of premium income on medical care.66 The Act
also promises to greatly reduce the administrative costs of insurers in the
individual and small group markets through economies of scale achieved
by pooling insurance purchasers in the exchanges and eliminating the need
to investigate whether their insureds have preexisting conditions.67
Aside from the Medicaid expansion, the ACA provision that has
generated the most opposition on constitutional grounds is the requirement
that after 2013 most Americans who are not eligible for health care under a
government program must obtain an insurance policy with an "essential
health benefits package," or pay a tax "penalty" that is calculated
according to a complicated formula.68 Following a phase-in period, the
penalty will "reach $695 per person or 2.5 percent of household income,
whichever is greater," capped by an amount equal to the average national
58 Id. §§ 18031-44.
'9 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B (West 2003 & Supp. 2011).
"Id. § 45R.
61 Id. § 4980H(a).
62 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-1 I(a)(l).
63 Id. § 300gg-3(a) (no denial of coverage for preexisting conditions); id. § 300gg(a) (insurance
rates may only vary by factors unrelated to preexisting conditions). Insurance rates may vary by four
factors: whether the plan covers and individual or family; the "rating areas" established by each state;
age, with a three to one ceiling; and tobacco use, with a 1.5 to one ceiling).
' Id. §§ 300gg-2(a), 300gg-12.
65 1d. § 300gg-14.
66 Id. 300gg-18(b).
67See id. § 18091(a)(2)(J) ("Administrative costs for private health insurance, which were
$90,000,000,000 in 2006, are 26 to 30 percent of premiums in the current individual and small group
markets.").
6' 26 U.S.C.A § 5000A(b)-(c)(l) (West 2003 & Supp. 2011). On the services required of an
"essential health benefits package," see infra 248 and accompanying text.
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cost of purchasing a basic plan.69 The penalty will be exacted through a
person's federal income tax return.7 ° Otherwise, there is no criminal or
civil liability for failing to obtain insurance; neither liens nor levies on
property may be used to exact payment.7' Various groups of people also
are exempt from this requirement, including those eligible for Medicaid
and Medicare or whose premiums would be greater than eight percent of
their household earnings.72 Many other Americans will satisfy the
requirement through employer-based group policies. Those with religious
objections to insuring are exempted from the mandate,73 along with
undocumented residents, prison inmates,74 and members of Indian tribes.75
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE INSURANCE MANDATE
A. The Health Insurance Mandate and the Commerce Clause
Stripped to their essences, both the arguments for and against
Congress' power to impose the mandate under Article I are simple. To
proponents of the health care mandate, the requirement is easily justified
under the Commerce Clause,76 either alone or as augmented by the
Necessary and Proper Clause.77 Alternatively, they claim that the penalty
for not insuring amounts to a tax authorized by Congress' power to tax for
the general welfare.78
The mandate is key to accomplishing the ACA's health insurance
reforms. As noted, Congress set out to assure that nearly all Americans
were insured at affordable rates. But achieving this end required
eliminating the current policy in the industry of discriminating against
those with preexisting health conditions. Simply requiring that insurers
offer policies without regard to an individual's health status would not
work. Many healthy people would wait to purchase insurance until after
they were seriously ill or injured. Insurers would either abandon the
business or raise premiums to levels beyond the financial reach of
millions.79 By mandating that relatively healthy people purchase policies,
insurers are guaranteed a pool of enrollees who on average will spend less
69 Sallie Sanford, Understanding the Health Care Reform Litigation, JURIST, Feb. 16, 2012,
http://jurist.org/forum/2012/02/sallie-sanford-health-care.php.
70 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(b).
71 Id. § 5000A(g)(2)(B).
12Id. § 5000A(e).
7 Id. § 5000A(d)(2).
14 § 5000A(d)(4).
" Id. § 5000A(e)(3).
76 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
7Id cl. 18.
7See id. el. 1.
79 See Kahn & Kahn, supra note 41, at 79.
2012]
CONNECTICUT LA W REVIEW
on health care than their premiums, thus enabling the companies to build
sufficient reserves to pay the bills of those who consume services in excess
of what they paid for insurance. In theory, this should stabilize the market.
Younger Americans will offset the higher costs of older people who
account for a disproportionate portion of health care expenses. 80  Of
course, this works by averaging. Inevitably, a significant number of young
people will require expensive care that exceeds the premiums they have
paid.81
In United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court described three broad
"categories of activity" in which it has approved of congressional action
under the Commerce Clause. 82  "First, Congress may regulate the use of
the channels of interstate commerce. 83  To illustrate the type of laws
covered by this classification, the Court mentioned two cases with very
dissimilar facts. One was United States v. Darby, which upheld the regula-
tion of wages and hours for employees of businesses selling products
across state lines.84 The other was Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States,85 which sustained the ban on racial discrimination as applied to
hotels and motels that offered services for interstate customers. Lopez
quoted a line from that case approving "[t]he authority of Congress to keep
80 See id at 79-80.
81 See Mark W. Stanton, The High Concentration of U.S. Health Care Expenditures, RES. IN
ACTION (AHRQ, Rockville, Md.), June 2006, at 5, http://www.ahrq.gov/research/rial9/expendria.pdf
(presenting a study of Medicare enrollees that found that "8 percent of health care expenses occurred
during childhood (under age 20) [and] 13 percent during young adulthood (20-39 years) .... ).
82 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (following the classification scheme set forth
in Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971)).
83 id.
84 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 111 (1941). Two different mechanisms were employed
by Congress in justifying the law in question, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, both of which the
Court endorsed. First, the Court found that Congress had properly used the commerce-blocking
technique by banning "the shipment in interstate commerce of lumber manufactured by employees
whose wages are less than a prescribed minimum or whose weekly hours of labor at that wage are
greater than a prescribed maximum ...." Id. at 108. Second, it approved the power to regulate
directly the wages and hours "of workmen in the production of goods 'for interstate commerce' at other
than prescribed wages and hours." Id. The theory here was that in addition to stopping the movement
in interstate commerce of articles made by workers whose wages and hours were declared substandard
by the act, Congress could "stop the initial step toward transportation, production with the purpose of
so transporting it." Id. at 117. This justification actually better fits Lopez's third category of
permissible laws, those that regulate intrastate "activities that substantially affect interstate commerce."
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559; see also Darby, 312 U.S. at 118 (stating that Congress' commerce power
"extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power
of Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate
end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce"). Congress
determined that paying substandard wages to workers producing goods that shipped in interstate
commerce resulted in "the spread of substandard labor conditions ... and the consequent dislocation of
the commerce itself caused by the impairment or destruction of local businesses by competition made
effective through interstate commerce." Id. at 122.
85 379 U.S. 241, 261-62 (1964).
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the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious
uses .... ,16 An earlier case, Perez v. United States, gave two other
examples in which Congress acted to keep interstate channels from being
"misused": laws against "the shipment of stolen goods" in interstate
commerce or transporting "persons who have been kidnap[p]ed" across
state lines.87
The second Lopez category also combined two different kinds of laws
under one rubric: "Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate
commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate
,,88 89activities. Here the Court cited the Shreveport Rate Cases, which
upheld federal ratemaking for railway runs entirely within one state by a
carrier that also had interstate traffic, reasoning that its rates were
"unreasonably discriminating against interstate traffic over its line" and
thus interfered with the Interstate Commerce Commission's regulation of
interstate traffic. 90 The intrastate rates thus had "a close and substantial
relation to interstate traffic."9' A second case also involved interstate
railroads, with the Court sustaining the federal Safety Appliance Act as
applied to train cars used on both interstate and intrastate railroads. There
was "a close or direct relation or connection between the two classes of
traffic 9 2 because the cars were generally "used interchangeably in moving
both,, 93 and consequently "whatever brings delay or disaster to one, or
results in disabling one of its operatives, is calculated to impede the
progress and imperil the safety of other trains."94 Other examples given by
Lopez of laws protecting instrumentalities were those proscribing the
destruction of aircraft and stealing from interstate shipments.95
A third kind of commerce case detailed by Lopez involved laws
regulating "activities that substantially affect interstate commerce," even if
6 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (quoting Heart ofAtlanta, 379 U.S. at 256) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
87 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2312-15 (2006) (proscribing the shipment of
various types of stolen goods in interstate or foreign commerce) and 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2006)
(outlawing transportation of kidnapped persons across state lines and traveling in interstate or foreign
commerce or using the mail or any means, facility, or instrumentality of interstate or foreign
commerce" to carry out a kidnapping)).
88 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
89 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
90 Id. at 354.
91 
Id. at 351.
92 S. Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 26 (1911).
93 Id. at 27.
94 Id.
9' Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 32 (2006) (proscribing destruction of aircrafts) and
§ 659 (prohibiting thefts from interstate shipments)).
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96the regulated activities are themselves intrastate in character. The Court
cited two cases as support. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., the
Court validated the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act
protecting the formation of labor unions for the purpose of engaging in
collective bargaining, as applied to a steel plant that used materials shipped
in interstate commerce to manufacture products predominately destined for
sale out of state.97 A long line of cases had held that manufacturing was
not commerce, which was confined to "trade, traffic, commerce,
transportation, or communication" across either state or international
borders. 98 If "separately viewed," the "productive industry" was a "local"
activity, 99 but this was not dispositive because there was a "close and
intimate relation" 100 between the manufacturing of steel and interstate
commerce.' 0 1 The refusal of employers "to confer and negotiate" with
unions "has been one of the most prolific causes of strife" in industry.'12 A
disruption in manufacturing operations caused by "industrial strife" would
have "paralyzing consequences" for interstate commerce because strikes in
production facilities would disrupt the commercial chain; thus affecting the
mining of raw materials and the transportation of them to factories, as well
as the subsequent sale of the products across the country and abroad.'0 3
Another example cited by Lopez was Maryland v. Wirtz, which approved
an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.1°4 That case
extended the minimum wage guarantees beyond employees "engaged in
96 Id at 558-59 (citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 n.27 (1968)). There is a theoretical
question as to whether the "substantial effects" prong is justified by the Necessary & Proper Clause
acting in tandem with the Commerce Clause. See Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why
the Individual Health Insurance Mandate is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 593
(2010); Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudence of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 2002 U. ILL. L.
REV. 581, 619 (2002). It is plausible at least that regulating local acts that have substantial effects on
interstate commerce is one of those instances suggested by McCulloch v. Maryland, in which "the
powers given to the government imply the ordinary means of execution," regardless of whether there
was a Necessary and Proper Clause. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 409 (1819). But the issue is of no
practical importance.97 301 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1937).
98 Id. at 31.
99 1d at38.
' Id. at 37.
'' Id. at 38.
'
02 Id. at 42.
103 Id. at 41; see also id. at 42 ("And of what avail is it to protect the facility of transportation, if
interstate commerce is throttled with respect to the commodities to be transported!"). This was
particularly true of Jones & Laughlin Steel, which was considered a "highly integrated" business, id. at
27, that owned and/or operated everything from the mines that produced the raw materials for steel, the
shipping facilities to transport them to the plant, and the entire distribution network for shipping and
selling the products around the country and in Canada, see id. at 26-28. "When industries organize
themselves on a national scale .... their relation to interstate commerce [is] the dominant factor in their
activities." Id. at 41.
104 Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 187-88 (1968).
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commerce or in the production of goods in commerce," to encompass all
employees in an enterprise "engaged in commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce," including those employed by state governments. 0 5
These three categories of Commerce Clause-based legislation are not
hermetically distinct from one another. In Heart of Atlanta, the Court
approved two different bases for Congress' use if the Commerce Clause
powers to enact the public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. First, Congress was eliminating an "immoral and injurious"
use of the channels of interstate commerce. 1 6 Second, the law was
separately justified as ending a practice that had "substantial and harmful
effect[s]"'' 0 7 on interstate commerce by "discouraging travel on the part of
a substantial portion of the Negro community." °  Similarly, in
Katzenbach v. McClung, the companion case to Heart of Atlanta, the Court
upheld the Civil Rights Act as applied to Ollie's Barbecue, an Alabama
eatery situated eleven blocks from the interstate highway that refused to
serve blacks inside the restaurant, as a regulation removing injurious uses
of interstate commerce.109 Echoing Heart of Atlanta, the Court held that
racial discrimination in food service "had a direct and highly restrictive
effect upon interstate travel by Negroes."" 0 Consequently, these kinds of
segregated restaurants resulted in "less interstate goods because of the
discrimination.""' In Katzenbach, "a substantial portion of the food
served by the restaurant had moved in interstate commerce.
' 12
Presumably the volume of such purchases would increase without
discrimination. Restaurants also were essential to travel, and they catered
to customers who were traveling on interstate journeys. Discrimination by
restaurants "obviously discourages travel and obstructs interstate
commerce for one can hardly travel without eating.,,"
3
By itself, Ollie's had a trivial effect on interstate commerce, but as in
Wickard v. Filburn, its "contribution, taken together with that of many
others similarly situated, is far from trivial."' 14 Like the loan shark in
Perez, Ollie's was "representative of many others throughout the country,
the total incidence of which if left unchecked may well become far-
105 Id. at 185-86 (citing 52 U.S.C. §§ 206(a), 207(a)).
106 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964) (quoting Caminetti v.
United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917)).
'0' Id. at 258.
'08 Id. at 253.
"9 379 U.S. 294, 296 (1964).
"o Id. at 300.
"1 Id.112 Id. at 296-97.
.. Id. at 300.
114 Id. at 301 (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942)).
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reaching in its harm to commerce." ' " Congress also considered evidence
showing that this "discrimination deterred professional, as well as skilled,
people from moving into areas where such practices occurred and thereby
caused industry to be reluctant to establish there."'
' 16
Another instance in which there were two separate grounds for
applying the Commerce Clause was Pierce County v. Guillen. 17  The
Court approved a provision in a federal highway-funding act that gave
money to states for improving dangerous road condition, but required them
to undertake "a thorough evaluation of its public roads."'" 8  Congress
excluded the admission of these studies in litigation suits, as they were
concerned that the states would be reluctant to undertake candid studies of
road conditions out of fear that the information could be used against them
in tort actions arising from accidents on roads deemed hazardous'" 9 The
Court agreed with the government that the law was justified under the first
two Lopez categories because it both "aimed at improving safety in the
channels of commerce and increasing protection for the instrumentalities
of interstate commerce." 1
20
With regard to the ACA, either the first or third bases for Commerce
Clause regulation can support the provisions banning consideration of
preexisting conditions and imposing lifetime limits on coverage. As to
regulating the channels of interstate commerce, Congress found that health
insurance was mostly "sold by national or regional health insurance
companies ... in interstate commerce and claims payments flow through
interstate commerce.' 2' Insurance itself is a form of commerce, the Court
held in the 1944 case, United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Ass'n., 22 which Congress cited to justify using its commerce powers to
enact the mandate. 23 Both the sale of health insurance and the payments
insurers make to beneficiaries utilize "the channels of interstate com-
merce."'124 Moreover, health insurance "pays for medical supplies, drugs,
and equipment that are shipped in interstate commerce," to the tune of
about $854 billion in 2009. A large number of Americans also travel to
115 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301 (1964) (quoting Polish Nat'l Alliance of the U.S.
v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 322 U.S. 643, 648 (1944)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
116 Id. at 300.
117 537 U.S. 129 (2003)
... 537 U.S. at 129.
"9 See id. at 133-34 (describing the reasoning behind Congress' adoption of 23 U.S.C. § 409 and
the various concerns expressed by the states surrounding the possible misuse of these studies for
litigious purposes).
121 Id. at 147.
12 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(B) (West 2003 & Supp. 2011).
122 322 U.S. 533, 552-53 (1944); see Mark A. Hall, Commerce Clause Challenges to Health Care
Reform, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 1825, 1834 (2011).
123 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
124 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
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other states and foreign countries to receive medical care, which in the case
of American-provided services typically is paid for by insurance or public
benefit programs.' 25  The common practices of insurance companies
discriminating against persons with preexisting conditions and imposing
lifetime caps on claims can be said to constitute "injurious uses" of
interstate commerce like those identified in Heart of Atlanta Motel and
Katzenbach v. McClung. Race discrimination in lodging had "qualitative
as well as quantitative effect on interstate travel by Negroes.' 26  The
"pleasure and convenience" of black travelers were adversely affected
because they were "continually... uncertain of finding lodging."'
' 27
Travel itself was hindered, as Congress found that "this uncertainty
stemming from racial discrimination had the effect of discouraging travel
on the part of a substantial portion of the Negro community.'
128
These insurance reforms also address conditions that have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. 29  Expanding the number of people with
insurance unquestionably will result in greater spending on health care.
The discrimination against preexisting conditions and the ceilings on
insurance coverage prevent millions of Americans from obtaining
coverage-and, effectively, from spending money on health care-which
unquestionably has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.1 30  Those
who received billions of dollars annually in uncompensated care also
passed on their costs to providers and insured people, thus making
coverage increasingly unaffordable and creating a self-perpetuating
2 42 U.S.C. § 18091(A)(2)(b); PIERRE L. YOUNG & LEIGHANNE OLSEN, THE HEALTHCARE
IMPERATIVE: LOWERING COSTS AND IMPROVING OUTCOMES: WORKSHOP SERIES SUMMARY 145-46
(2010), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.govfbooks/NBK53920/pdfTOC.pdf (estimating the
overall Billing and Insurance-Related (BIR) costs in the U.S. Healthcare System in 2009 to be $105
billion); see also Anne B. Martin et al., Health Spending by State of Residence, 1991-2004, 26 HEALTH
AFF. 651, 658-70 (2007) (estimating out-of-state health care within the United States).
126 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 253 (1964).
127 Id.
128 id.
129 Congress found that "The individual responsibility requirement" itself "is commercial and
economic in nature, and substantially affects interstate commerce." 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(1). That
may be true, and bolsters the idea that the mandate is a "proper" regulation for purposes of the
Necessary and Proper Clause, but is not the test for whether a law can be justified on "substantial
effects" grounds. The question is not whether the regulation has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce, but whether it regulates "activities that substantially affect interstate commerce." Lopez,
514 U.S. at 558-59.
130 "According to several studies and CBO's own analysis of the nonelderly population, the
uninsured use about 50 percent to 70 percent as many health care services as the insured." CBO, supra
note 33, at 71. The CBO also determined that "extending insurance coverage to the uninsured would
increase the number of physicians' visits by 30 percent to 50 percent for children and by 60 percent to
100 percent for adults." Id. at 75. The exact increase in spending that will occur from the ACA cannot
be predicted, as it depends on variables such as the types of plans people purchase, but overall, "the
increase in use of services by previously uninsured individuals would also yield a corresponding
increase in health care spending." Id. at 76.
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economic cycle that threatened the viability of an insurance industry
consisting of nationally-operating firms.'31  Moreover, the average cost-
shifting of $1000 per family that the ACA prevents will likely affect
patterns of spending.132 Lowering administrative costs for insurance could
also put more money in the pockets of consumers. 33 Furthermore, health
insurers are dependent on resources obtained via interstate commerce as
well as communications across state lines. In addition, the medical
services that they fund involve a massive consumption of goods and
services purchased in interstate commerce as well as compensation for
providers of the care.
ACA reforms also promise to create a healthier population, which will
have substantial economic effects. Those with insurance are more likely to
obtain preventive care as well as treatment in an appropriate facility (a
doctor's clinic rather than an ER), which, in turn, saves money.134
Furthermore, preventing diseases produces a healthier and more productive
population.' 35 There also will be major consequences for employment, not
only from the elimination of preexisting conditions, but also from tax
credits to encourage businesses to provide insurance. The CBO found that
these reforms could "affect people's incentives to enter the labor force,
work fewer or more hours, retire, change jobs, or even prefer certain types
of firms or jobs.' 36  For example, employees with current medical
conditions often find themselves locked into their jobs, or their choices of
131 See supra text accompanying notes 44-48.
132 See supra text accompanying note 47.
133 See SARA R. COLLINS ET AL., ISSUE BRIEF: How HEALTH CARE REFORM CAN LOWER THE
COSTS OF INSURANCE ADMINISTRATION 10 (2009), available at http://www.commonwealth-
fund.org/-/media/Files/Publications/Issue%2OBrief/2009/Ju/Admin%2Costs/l 299-Collins how hit_
carereform can lower costs ins adminv2.pdf (stating that administrative costs affect premium
costs, which come out of the pockets of employees and employers).
134 The savings from increased preventive care vary significantly by the types of services
provided. "Certain types of preventive services have been found to yield substantial net savings,
largely because the initial costs are low and the long-term benefits are large." CBO, supra note 33, at
138 (citing as an example that "physicians can quickly explain the benefits and harms of daily aspirin
use for the prevention of cardiovascular events for middle-aged patients ...."). However, the use of
other preventive services may offset the financial benefits, as additional spending will occur from the
direct cost of the care (including follow-up testing and treatment) as well as treating adverse reactions
and caring for other diseases that may occur as a result of extending the life span of patients. Id. at
137-38. To the extent this actually occurs, it merely proves that the ACA reforms will inject more
money into health-related services.
' See id. at 167 ("Studies have found that healthier workers work more hours and earn higher
wages than those who are less healthy. That relationship suggests that changes to the health insurance
market that lead to better health outcomes could both increase the labor supply and raise productivity
(presumably, workers earn higher wages when they are healthy because they are more productive).").
"'6Id at 162.
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new employment are limited. 137 As will be explained more fully below,
federal law already provides for the portability of insurance from
employment offering group-based policies to other companies with similar
coverage. 38  However, workers with preexisting conditions who might
otherwise take jobs with employers not offering group plans or start their
own businesses will not do so if the only option for health insurance in
those positions excludes their preexisting conditions or is altogether
unobtainable or unaffordable. 39 The effect on productivity is obvious
even if precisely unquantifiable. As the CBO determined, "workers
may ... choose to stay in their current positions solely to retain their
current health coverage rather than move to other jobs in which they could
be more productive. '' 4 °
To be sure, health insurance is regulated primarily by the states, which
typically forbid consumers from purchasing insurance in other
jurisdictions.' 4' That feature of the insurance market has led some
commentators who are skeptical of the Act's constitutionality to conclude
• • ,,U4
that "there is little or no interstate trade in insurance. What this
neglects is that the predominant state role is a consequence of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, which was enacted in response to South-
Eastern Underwriters. 143  In determining that insurance was a form of
commerce, the Court had overturned a longstanding contrary decision that
it was not a type of commerce and hence could be regulated by the states
without running afoul of the Dormant Commerce Clause.44 Although
South-Eastern Underwriters upheld application of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act to price-fixing of fire insurance premium rates in six states by an
association of insurers, the ruling had implications for state power under
the Dormant Commerce Clause. Under that doctrine, the states were
'37See id. at 164-65 (discussing in greater detail the phenomenon of "job lock," in which
employees remain in jobs that provide health insurance covering preexisting conditions instead of
pursuing other potentially better employment opportunities).
138 See infra notes 152-56. and accompanying text (discussing the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act).
139 See note 136 and accompanying text.
140 CBO, supra note 33, at 165. The CBO also found, however, that companies "may have a
greater incentive to invest in their workers (by providing training or increasing their skills or
knowledge) if the probability of retaining those workers is increased" because of their impaired
mobility due to the employment-based insurance structure. Id.
141 Stephanie Kanwit, The Purchase of Insurance Across State Lines in the Individual Market, 37
3L. MED. & ETHicS 150, 150 (2009) ("Health insurers have traditionally been allowed to sell a policy
only within the state that approved and regulates that particular policy.").
142 E.g., Claeys, supra note 1, at 59.
14' 322 U.S. 533 (1944); see generally Steven J. Williams, Distinguishing "Insurance" from
Investment Products Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act: Crafting a Rule of Decision, 98 COLUM. L.
REv 1996,2006 (1998).
'44See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1868) ("Issuing a policy of insurance is not a
transaction of commerce.").
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constrained in regulating interstate commerce, and that would include
insurance sold through interstate markets.1 45  Southeastern Underwriters
thus threatened to deprive states of their longstanding regulatory powers
over insurance. The McCarran-Ferguson Act prevented that result by
providing that no federal statute shall preempt any state law dealing with
the "regulation and taxation . . . of the business of insurance ... ., 46 If
McCarran-Ferguson was not in effect, health insurance undoubtedly would
be sold across state lines by national companies. It is thus disingenuous to
suggest that state dominance of insurance regulation is a consequence of it
not being a form of interstate commerce. The states have had the primary
role because Congress so dictated.
The Act unquestionably regulates the commercial activity of buying
and selling health insurance. It dictates the terms under which policies can
be offered by prohibiting insurers from excluding applicants or charging
them higher rates for preexisting conditions 47 and removing lifetime caps
on coverage.148  "The power to regulate commerce is the power 'to
prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed.' It extends not
only to those regulations which aid, foster and protect the commerce, but
embraces those which prohibit it.,, 149 Over the years, Congress has used its
commerce power to enact several important measures regulating health
insurance,15° principally the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 ("ERISA")15' and Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act ("HIPAA"). 152  For group policies obtained in connection with
employee benefits, insurers may not charge different rates for covered
employees based on their health status.153 HIPAA provides that insurers
offering policies to businesses that have fewer than fifty employees must
accept all applicants. 154  Further, it requires insurers in both group and
individual markets to renew coverage without regard to health
conditions.155 Moreover, as its name implies, HIPAA also mandates
portability of health insurance, allowing a person with a group policy
through an employer to continue coverage after leaving the employment,
either through a plan offered in a new job or on the individual market,
145 See United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 539, 553(1944).
146 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2006).
147 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
148 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
141 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 113 (1941) (internal citation omitted).
150 See CBO, supra note 33, at 80 (summarizing federal laws).
'1 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006).
152 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1181-1191c
(2006).
13 29 U.S.C.A. § 1182 (West 2003 & Supp. 2011); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-I (West 2003 & Supp.
2011).
114 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-1 l(a)(1)(A) (West 2003 & Supp. 2011).
"' Id. § 300gg-42(a).
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without regard for preexisting conditions (although the insurer can charge
higher rates for new individual policies). 15 6 Similarly, there are scores of
federal laws and accompanying regulations controlling the terms of
consumer contracts, such as the various statutes banning false or
misleading statements in agreements.
57
Opponents of the insurance mandate cannot seriously argue that the
direct regulation of insurance policy terms is beyond the scope of the
Commerce Clause. Rather, they urge that the mandate itself does not
regulate the provisions of policies. Forcing people to buy insurance, so the
argument goes, is not a regulation of commerce. Rather than controlling
existing commercial activities, the mandate requires people to enter
commerce or pay a penalty for failing to do so. 158 As the Eleventh Circuit
pointed out in holding the mandate to be unauthorized by the Commerce
Clause, "to the extent the uninsured can be said to be 'active,' their activity
consists of the absence of such behavior, at least with respect to health
insurance., 159  The court quoted the Supreme Court's statement in 2010,
that "thus far in our Nation's history our cases have upheld Commerce
Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic
in nature."'16 There are only two cases since 1937 in which the Court has
struck down attempts to use the Commerce Clause as the basis of
legislation, and both involved laws that criminalized noneconomic
behavior. United States v. Lopez overturned the Gun Free School Zones
Act on the ground that the conduct it prohibited, possession of a firearm
near a school, had "nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic
enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms."' 61 The other
56 Id. § 300gg-41.
157 See, e.g., SEC v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 148 (1st Cir. 2008) ("Since their inception, it has
been unlawful [under federal securities laws] to offer or sell a securities using a false or misleading
statement.").
158 See, e.g., Claeys, supra note 1, at 62, 67 ("Obamacare's individual mandate . . . applies
insurance regulation to people who have done nothing-and want to do nothing-to obtain any
insurance .... [T]he government would not be 'regulating' commerce between voluntary parties if it
compelled one party to buy a service from another under protest."); Cuccinelli et al., supra note 2, at
295-96 ("Because this domain of inactivity is not protected by any of the other checks and balances,
permitting regulation of inactivity under the Commerce Clause would subject the entire person to
federal control in a way that would be deemed intolerable by citizens who value individualism above
the meliorist programs of government.").
159 Florida ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. U.S. Dep't Health & Hum. Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1287 (1 1th Cir.
2011), cert. granted in part 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011).
160 Id. at 1286 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). All of the laws approved by the Court under the Commerce Clause "cases involve
activity, not inactivity. In none of these cases did the government mandate that citizens engage in
economic activity by entering into a contract with a private company." Barnett, supra note 96, at 605.
161 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995). "The possession of a gun in a local school
zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect
any sort of interstate commerce." Id. at 567.
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decision, United States v. Morrison, invalidated the criminalization of
gender-motivated violence in the Violence Against Women Act, which,
like gun possession, was "not, in any sense of the phrase, economic
activity."
It is true that when the Supreme Court has sustained legislation under
the Commerce Clause, it invariably has "involved attempts by Congress to
regulate preexisting, freely chosen classes of activities. ' 63 On this basis,
the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that by "choosing not to purchase health
insurance, the individuals regulated by the individual mandate are hardly
involved in the 'production, distribution, and consumption of
commodities,' which was the broad definition of economics" given by the
Court as recently as 2005.'64 "Rather, to the extent the uninsured can be
said to be 'active,' their activity consists of the absence of such behavior,
at least with respect to health insurance.'
' 65
Undeniably, the cases approving use of the Commerce Clause to reach
intrastate activities on the ground that they substantially effect interstate
commerce have concerned regulation of an "already existing or ongoing
activity."'' 66 By contrast, when Congress blocks interstate movement, it
prevents activity, and the motivation for the ban need not be economic.
167
In Wickard v. Filburn,'68 for example, the Court upheld a requirement of
the Agricultural Adjustment Act that forced a farmer named Roscoe
Filbum to pay a penalty because he grew and consumed wheat on his farm
in excess of his government-determined market quota. When the wheat
that Filburn grew and consumed was taken into account, he had exceeded
the established limit. The Act thus "extend[ed] federal regulation to
production not intended in any part for commerce but wholly for
consumption on the farm."'169 In effect, the farmer was forced to buy wheat
for home use on the market, requiring him to enter commerce against his
will. Still, as the Eleventh Circuit emphasized, "Filbum was a commercial
farmer and thus far more amenable to Congress's commerce power than an
162 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
163 Florida, 648 F.3d at 1286; see also id. at 1291-92 ("Individuals subjected to this economic
mandate have not made a voluntary choice to enter the stream of commerce, but instead are having that
choice imposed upon them by the federal government. This suggests that they are removed from the
traditional subjects of Congress's commerce authority, in the same manner that the regulated actors in
Lopez and Morrison were removed from the traditional subjects of Congress's commerce authority by
virtue of the noneconomic cast of their activity.").
'6Id. at 1286 (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005)).
"6 Id. at 1287.
'6Id. at 1285.
167 For example, federal law criminalizes interstate flight of fugitives regardless of whether their
crimes are commercial or economic in nature. Fugitive Felon Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (2006).
16' 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
161Id. at 118.
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ordinary citizen.' 70  Filburn "could have decided to make do with the
amount of wheat he was allowed to grow. He could have redirected his
efforts to agricultural endeavors that required less wheat. He could have
even ceased part of his fanning operations."' 7' Similarly, in Heart of
Atlanta and Katzenbach, the businesses in question were forced to do
something against their will, but they already were operating commercial
enterprises. 72 The same could be said of any regulatory requirement that
obliges businesses or individuals to take some action or refrain from doing
SO.
The Supreme Court has been skeptical of arguments for congressional
action under the Commerce Clause that have no logical stopping point to
limit national legislative power. Both Lopez and Morrison rejected the
argument that federal punishment of gun possession near schools or sexual
assault on women could be justified because they have ramifications for
the national economy. If Congress were allowed to punish criminal
activity merely because in the aggregate the "costs of crime" have
substantial effects on national productivity, then it likewise "could regulate
any activity that it found was related to the economic productivity of
individual citizens: family law (including marriage, divorce, and child
custody), for example.' ' 7 3 There would be no limit "on federal power,
even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where States
historically have been sovereign. Thus, if we were to accept the
Government's arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by an
individual that Congress is without power to regulate.'
' 74
Anticipating this objection, Congress asserted in the ACA that the
activities the law regulates are "economic and financial decisions about
how and when health care is paid for, and when health insurance is
purchased."175 These consumer choices are "commercial and economic in
nature" because without the mandate "some individuals would make an
economic and financial decision to forego health insurance coverage and
attempt to self-insure .... , 176 Likewise, the government has argued in its
brief on the mandate to the Supreme Court that the act "regulates economic
conduct with a substantial effect on interstate commerce, namely the way
170 Florida, 648 F.3d at 1291 (citation omitted).
171 Id.
172 See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261-62 (1964) (holding that
Congress has the power under Constitution to require motels to end discriminatory practices);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (holding that Congress has the power under the
Constitution to require restaurants to end discriminatory practices).
113 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
114 Id.; see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612-13 (2000) (adopting the reasoning
established in Lopez).
' 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(A) (West 2003 & Supp. 2011).
176 id.
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in which individuals finance their participation in the health care
market.' 77 These "are quintessentially economic" acts regulated as part of
a complex legislative package intended to treat an economic problem of
the first magnitude. 78  Virtually everyone needs medical treatments at
some point, the exact timing and cost of which frequently cannot be
predicted. People do not schedule their heart attacks or cancers any more
than they do injury-causing accidents. As the government aptly
characterizes the behavior of uninsured people, they "externalize the risks
and costs of much of their health care; the minimum coverage provision
will require that they internalize them (or pay a tax penalty). This is
classic economic regulation of economic conduct., 179  By contrast, the
laws invalidated in Lopez and Morrison were "single-subject statute[s]"
that regulated criminal behavior without regard to whether the acts had
"any connection to past interstate activity or a predictable impact on future
commercial activity."' 8 °
Each individual decision not to insure has a de minimis effect on the
economy. However, when Congress employs the third basis for invoking
the Commerce Clause (substantial effects), it may consider the aggregate
consequences of those choices by millions of Americans. By that token,
Roscoe Filburn's consumption of home-grown wheat may have been
"trivial by itself," but that did "not . . . remove him from the scope of
federal regulation" because his action, "taken together with that of many
others similarly situated, [was] far from trivial."'181 Considered as a whole,
"consumption of homegrown wheat on interstate commerce . . . consti-
tute[d] the most variable factor in the disappearance of the wheat crop.' 82
Just as "[h]ome grown wheat in this sense competes with wheat in
commerce," those who self-insure compete with people who have policies,
producing a major economic effect on them as well as taxpayers. 183
Not everyone will consume medical care that costs more than the
person can afford to pay out of pocket. This merely shows that the law is
over-inclusive. But that does not render it irrational or otherwise
constitutionally suspect. Provided that Congress is attempting to regulate
interstate commerce, it may reach actors who otherwise would fall outside
the commerce power. The loan shark in Perez v. United States was
punished under a federal law banning extortionate credit transactions on
177 Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 7, at 18.
178 Gonzales v. Raich, 541 U.S. 1, 25 (2009).
179 Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 7, at 19.
80 Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 23 (characterizing Lopez and Morrison)
181 Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 127 (1942); see also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,
123 (1941) ("It recognized that in present day industry, competition by a small part may affect the
whole and that the total effect of the competition of many small producers may be great.").
82 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127.
83 Id. at 128.
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the theory that loansharking was "in large part under the control of
'organized crime,',,184 which was "interstate and international in
character."' 185 It made no difference whether the defendant was working
for the mafia or a freelancing hoodlum, for he was "one of the species
commonly known as 'loan sharks."",186 Congress was entitled to regulate
the entire "class of activities ... without proof that the particular intrastate
,,1 87
activity against which a sanction was laid had an effect on commerce.
Like the loan shark, uninsured Americans belong to a class of people
who cause interstate effects even though it is not possible for Congress to
know who in particular will wind up shifting costs. The government has
highlighted the personal situation of one of the original plaintiffs in the
Florida litigation, Mary Brown, who claimed that she did "not believe that
the cost of health insurance coverage [was] a wise or acceptable use of
[her] financial resources."' 88  She and her husband have since filed for
bankruptcy, listing "among their liabilities thousands of dollars in unpaid
medical bills, including bills from out-of-state providers. . . .Those
liabilities are uncompensated care that will ultimately be paid for by other
market participants.' ' 189 Anyone could suffer from such overconfidence in
their fortunes, aside from the relatively small number of Americans who
can afford to wear diamonds on the soles of their shoes. 190 And the
existence of a certain number who are too-rich-to fail is irrelevant to the
constitutionality of the mandate. "Where the class of activities is regulated
and that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no
power 'to excise, as trivial, individual instances' of the class."' 19'
Critics of the mandate have responded to the claim that the decision
not to insure has a major economic effect on the insurance market by
arguing that it proves too much because it assumes that inactivity
constitutes economic activity, leading to a slippery doctrinal slope that
184 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 147 (1971).
'
5 d. at 147 n.1.
186 1d. at 147.
187 Id. at 152 (citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941)).
188 Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 7, at 44.
189 Id; see also David G. Savage, Plaintiff Challenging Healthcare Lv Went Bankrupt-With
Unpaid Medical Bills, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2012.
190 See PAUL SIMON & JOSEPH SHABALALA, Diamonds on the Soles of Her Shoes, on
GRACELAND (Warner Bros. Records 1986).
'9'Perez, 402 U.S. at 154 (citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 193 (1968) (emphasis
omitted)). Brown also had $55,000 in other types of debts, such as those owed to retailers. Savage,
supra note 189. According to her attorneys, "the Government's reasoning would allow Congress to
compel the purchase of insurance (or other products) that would have reduced the 'cost-shifting'
facilitated by bankruptcy laws and other government benefits for the needy." Brief for Private
Respondents on the Individual Mandate at 55, United States Dep't Health & Human Servs. v. Florida,
No. 11-398, (Feb. 6, 2012). This ignores the uniqueness of health care. Unlike Brown's other
purchases, health care was the one she could neither predict with accuracy nor avoid once it inevitably
was needed.
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would destroy the most basic constitutional limitation on national
legislation-that Congress must justify its products as falling under one of
the Constitution's enumerated powers. According to the Eleventh Circuit
majority, "[flew powers, if any, could be more attractive to Congress than
compelling the purchase of certain products.' 92 Randy Barnett has written
that
the [ACA] speciously tries to convert inactivity into the
'activity' of making a "decision." By this reasoning, a
'decision' not to take a job or not to sell your house or not
to buy a Chevrolet is an 'activity that is commercial and
economic in nature' that can be mandated by Congress.
193
The district court judge in the Florida litigation seized on this point,
concluding that
because virtually no one can be divorced from the
transportation market, Congress could require that
everyone above a certain income threshold buy a General
Motors automobile-now partially government-owned-
because those who do not buy GM cars (or those who buy
foreign cars) are adversely impacting commerce and a
taxpayer-subsidized business. '94
For that matter,
Congress could require that people buy and consume
broccoli at regular intervals, not only because the required
purchases will positively impact interstate commerce, but
also because people who eat healthier tend to be healthier,
and are thus more productive and put less of a strain on the
health care system.195
Others have suggested that the same rationale for mandating insurance
purchases would justify Congress compelling people to join health clubs
due to the well-documented connection between exercise and health. 1
96
'9' Florida, 648 F.3d at 1289.
193 Barnett, supra note 96, at 605.
194 Florida ex rel. Bondi v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256,
1289 (N.D. Fla. 2011), affd in part, rev'd in part 648 F.3d 1235 (2011), cert. granted in part 132 S.
Ct. 604 (2011).
195 Id.
19 "Yet if the federal government can require people to buy insurance in order to keep premiums
affordable, could it also require people to buy baby aspirin or a gym membership to keep those
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There are critical differences between these examples of potential
overreaching by Congress and the health care mandate. Unlike medical
care, no one literally needs an automobile, much less a Chevy. The force
of that rebuttal admittedly withers somewhat when one considers the
Eleventh Circuit's that there are other situations where Congress might
find it beneficial to the economy to compel people to insure or buy some
other product. "Few powers, if any, could be more attractive to Congress
than compelling the purchase of certain products."' 97  Consider flood
insurance, which the Eleventh Circuit highlighted. A large percentage of
Americans with property in flood-prone areas fail to insure themselves
against inevitable but uncertain inundation, knowing that the government
likely will step forward with relief. The massive cost of recovery is
thereby shifted to others. 98 If the health insurance mandate is constitu-
tional as a means to deal with cost-shifting, the court reasoned, so too is
compulsory flood insurance. By the same token, Congress could dictate
that all auto drivers carry a minimum of liability insurance to pay for the
harms they cause to others in accidents. That the states already impose
such a requirement might not satisfy Congress. Perhaps it concluded that
the states require too little insurance or that it is preferable to have a
uniform policy, which might facilitate interstate travel in a manner not
unlike federally mandated safety equipment on vehicles. But these
examples are missing critical elements present with health insurance. Just
as no one really needs to drive, living near a flood plain is a choice.
Furthermore, the uninsured homeowners in that situation are rolling the
dice, for there is no guarantee that the government will come forward with
aid in sufficient amounts, as many of the victims of Hurricane Katrina and
other natural disasters can attest.
Dealing with cost-shifting is not, by itself, sufficient to sustain
legislation under the Commerce Clause, or at least it is very unlikely that
the Supreme Court would accept such a rationale. Social ills often involve
cost-shifting. A thief, for example, appropriates the wealth of others, and
when the individual losses from all larcenies nationwide are totaled, the
economic effect is significant. People who carry firearms arguably may
benefit themselves by increasing their personal security (or at least their
sense of security), yet predictably doing so will harm others in some
instances. The student in Lopez who brought a gun to school, for example,
may have felt more secure or gained some other psychic advantage from
doing so, but acts like his have economic effects on others (such as the
premiums affordable, on the theory that using these products reduces the use of health care services and
thus insurance costs?" Wendy K. Mariner et al., Can Congress Make You Buy Broccoli? And Why
That's a Hard Question, 364 NEw ENG. J. MED. 201,202 (2011).
19' Florida, 648 F.3d at 1289.
'"Id. at 1289-90.
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medical bills of other students who are victims of an accidental discharge
or caught in a cross-fire). The rapists in Morrison gratified themselves at
the expense of their victim.
For the same reason, Congress should not be authorized to use its
commerce powers simply to elude the political obligation of having to
make transfer payments to those in need, as in the flood insurance
example. That justification would have no logical stopping point.
Government almost never is constitutionally compelled to render aid to
people, putting aside its obligations to those who are incarcerated or civilly
committed. 199  Yet for political and humanitarian reasons, Congress
frequently helps people voluntarily. For example, the victims of crime
often require the assistance of others to recover and the aid not
uncommonly comes from the federal government, as when people covered
by Medicare or Medicaid suffer injuries from criminal acts. Similarly, a
parent who fails to make support payments for his or her children not only
shifts the obligations to the other parent but predictably impacts the public
fisc because government probably will wind up assuring that needs are
met. But avoiding such political pressures should not be enough in itself to
command individuals to help others in the name of the Commerce Clause.
It also should not be possible for Congress to command private
spending under the auspices of the Commerce Clause merely to increase
consumption of a service or product, even though doing so will help the
economy. That smacks too much of the efforts to justify the laws in Lopez
and Morrison on the ground that the crimes had economic consequences
for the nation. Of course, Congress may pursue these ends by using its
taxing and spending powers. In theory, it could purchase a fleet of Chevys
from GM at taxpayer expense and then offer them for "free" to all
Americans, an offer that most would not refuse. Or it might offer generous
tax credits for purchasers of American autos, as it has done for people who
buy hybrid vehicles. It could give a tax credit for buying a car from a
manufacturer partly owned by the United States, which is true of GM at the
moment. The Court has imposed essentially no limits on the objects of
congressional spending, save the meaningless restriction that "the exercise
of the spending power must be in pursuit of 'the general welfare.' 2 ° The
only restraints on congressional extravagance in taxing and spending are
political.20 1  "The remedy for excessive taxation is in the hands of
199 See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) ("[Tjhe Due
Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be
necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive
the individual.").
200 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (citation omitted).
20. In United States v. Butler, the Court agreed with Alexander Hamilton's interpretation of the
Taxing and Spending Clause, holding that it "confers a power separate and distinct from those later
enumerated, is not restricted in meaning by the grant of them, and Congress consequently has a
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Congress, not the courts. '02
That the limits on the fiscal powers of Congress are primarily political
is a feature of the Taxing and Spending Clause.203 Spending can always be
rationalized as in the national interest, if for no other reason than it
stimulates the economy through job creation or redistributes wealth.
However, the fact that Congress could in effect impose insurance mandates
through taxing and spending-by levying a tax for the purpose of enrolling
everyone in a health plan-also is irrelevant to the Commerce Clause
question. It is a familiar principle that the separate grants of legislative
power in the Constitution must stand on their own feet.
For Congress to invoke the commerce power, the Court has always
demanded some relationship between the regulation imposed by Congress
and "commerce." Yet this requirement could not be more modest-
Congress need only show that "a 'rational basis' exists for... conclud-
ing"2°4 that the ultimate purpose of the law is to stimulate or discourage
"trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication" occurring
across state and national borders.20 5 Whether Congress' assumptions are
factually accurate is beside the point. In an Article I case, the Court will
not examine the validity of congressional factfinding, including whether a
given regulation actually will turn out to benefit the economy, since "by
their very nature such inquiries, where the legislative judgment is drawn in
question, must be restricted to the issue whether any state of facts either
known or which could reasonably be assumed affords support for it."
20 6
Curbing cost-shifting or avoiding the political necessity for
government spending may not alone be sufficient to invoke the Commerce
Clause, but that does not mean they are illegitimate purposes or irrelevant
substantive power to tax and to appropriate, limited only by the requirement that it shall be exercised to
provide for the general welfare of the United States." 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936).
202 United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 28 (1953), overruled in part Marchetti v. United
States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
203 In Helvering v. Davis, the Court observed that Art. I, § 8, cl. 1 draws a line "between one
welfare and another, between particular and general," but "[w]here this shall be placed cannot be
known through a formula in advance of the event." 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937). This is because "the
concept of the general welfare [is not] static. Needs that were narrow or parochial a century ago may
be interwoven in our day with the well-being of the Nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the
times." Id. at 641. Consequently, "[t]he discretion belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly
wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise ofjudgment," and that would require a 'showing
that by no reasonable possibility can the challenged legislation fall within the wide range of discretion
permitted to the Congress."' Id. at 640-41 (quoting Butler, 297 U.S. at 67).
204 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005).
205 Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31 (1937).
206 United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938) (upholding a federal ban on "filled
milk," finding that it was "at least debatable whether commerce in filled milk should be left
unregulated, or in some measure restricted, or wholly prohibited. As that decision was for Congress,




to whether the commerce power is being wielded constitutionally.
Controlling externalities from private behavior and saving the government
money often are cited as appropriate reasons to invoke the commerce
power.20 7 The externalities that Commerce Clause-based statutes target
often are impairments of commerce. This was true, for example, of
Filburn's wheat consumption, the union-busting actions of Jones &
Laughlin Steel, the lack of safety devices on trains, and thefts from
interstate shipments. So long as Congress is properly invoking its
commerce powers, as stated in U.S. v. Darby, "[t]he motive and purpose of
a regulation of interstate commerce are matters for the legislative judgment
upon the exercise of which the Constitution places no restriction and over
which the courts are given no control. 2 °8 In Darby, the imposition of
federal minimum wages on businesses was justified as a means to achieve
the "public policy that interstate commerce should not be made the
instrument of competition in the distribution of goods produced under
substandard labor conditions ...., It was no secret that the ultimate
goal of the law was to achieve what Congress thought to be a more
reasonable distribution of wealth than the free market.
In the case of mandating health insurance, Congress could rationally
conclude that it was addressing practices with substantial effects on
interstate commerce. The refusal of insurers to ignore preexisting
conditions or to cap lifetime benefits are impediments to interstate
commerce in that they retard consumption of medical goods and services.
Even if this was not so, insurance itself is a form of commerce, and
Congress need not explain why it wants to regulate it. For whatever
reason, it will not permit insurers to offer contracts that exclude preexisting
conditions or fix ceilings on total insurance benefits.
In Congress only imposed these reforms on the insurance market, it
would have solved one problem at the expense of creating others in the
form of exploding rates and withdrawal of insurers from the market. The
mandate is a way of reducing the adverse side-effects of the restrictions
Congress wishes to impose on insurance contracts. It is not a "brief,
single-subject statute" like the laws at issue in Lopez and Morrison.
Rather, it fits Lopez's approval of laws that are "an essential part of a
larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme
could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated."21 The
207 In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assoc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981), the Court
held that there was a rational basis for federal controls on strip mining because they were
"counteracting governmental programs and efforts to conserve soil, water, and other natural resources."
Id. at 277.20
' Darby, 312 U.S. at 115.
209 id.
210 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S 549, 561 (1995).
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choice of means for accomplishing this result is left to the discretion of
Congress, for the power to regulate commerce is the power "to prescribe
the rule by which commerce is to be governed., 21' Congress "may choose
the means reasonably adapted to the attainment of the permitted end, even
,,212isnthough they involve control of intrastate activities. There is no
requirement that "the means chosen" be "themselves within the granted
power," so long as they are "appropriate aids to the accomplishment of
some purpose within an admitted power of the national government. ' 213 In
Gonzales v. Raich, for example, the proscription at immediate issue was
growing and possessing marijuana for personal consumption. Neither was
a commercial act as no sales occurred, but nonetheless the prohibition was
"an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were
regulated. 2 1 4 For whatever reason, Congress wished to curb the interstate
market in marijuana, and "[p]rohibiting the intrastate possession or
manufacture of an article of commerce is a rational (and commonly
utilized) means of regulating commerce in that product., 215
Whatever else the mandate may be, it surely is a "regulation," even
under an eighteenth-century sense of that word. In upholding the
requirement, the D.C. Circuit referred to Samuel Johnson's definition of
"regulate" as .' [t]o adjust by rule or method,' as well as '[t]o direct.' To
"'direct,' in turn, included '[t]o prescribe certain measure[s]; to mark out a
certain course,' and '[t]o order; to command.' 21 6 The mandate commands
behavior-purchasing insurance-in order to enable it to regulate the
terms of health insurance contracts. Even if "regulate Commerce" in
Article I is restricted to influencing existing activity, the ACA does exactly
that: the existing activity can either be thought of as the act of participating
in the health care market without insurance or the practices of insurers in
offering insurance with conditions Congress wishes to eliminate from
interstate commerce.21 7
Whether the ultimate purpose of the mandate is relieving human
suffering by making access to care more affordable, preventing financial
211 Id. at 553 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824)).
212 Darby, 312 U.S. at 113 (quoting Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196). Congress "has, all will
agree, a large discretion as to the means to be employed in the exercise of any power granted to it." N.
Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 343 (1904).
21 Id. at 121.
214 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 24 (2004) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561); id. at 36 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("Congress's authority to enact laws necessary and proper for the regulation of interstate
commerce is not limited to laws directed against economic activities that have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.").
211 Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 26.
216 Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON,
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 1773) (entry for "regulate")).
217 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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devastation from ruinously high medical bills, or assuring the financial
condition of the health care and insurance industries, the result is the same.
In the familiar words of McCulloch v. Maryland, "[i]f the end be
legitimate, and within the scope of the constitution, all the means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, and which are not
prohibited, may constitutionally be employed to carry it into effect.,
218
It may be a new use of the commerce power to command action from
people merely because they are alive and living lawfully in America. A
mandate to purchase insurance is unprecedented in one sense identified by
the Eleventh Circuit: Congress has never used its commerce powers to
"require[] people to buy any good or service as a condition of lawful
residence in the United States," noting that economic "mandates typically
apply to people as parties to economic transactions, rather than as members
of society., 219  If sheer novelty were enough to scuttle a use of the
commerce power, much legislation would be unconstitutional. Chartering
the Bank of the United States during the Washington administration would
have been illegal because Congress had never done so previously. The
Interstate Commerce Commission would have been rejected as unprece-
dented when it was created in 1887. This is so with any new regulatory
strategy. The Court has said that the "[l]ack of historical precedent can
indicate a constitutional infirmity. '220 Novelty may reflect "past
constitutional doubts, 22 1 especially when "earlier Congresses avoided use
of this highly attractive power., 222 But, not necessarily. The newness of
an innovative legislative scheme may indicate nothing more than that there
has not previously been a reason for Congress to enact it.223 There was no
need for an agency to control interstate rail traffic until such traffic existed.
The framing generation did not have to concern themselves with the
economic problems surrounding a $2.6 trillion dollar industry.
Furthermore, the unusual nature of the mandate counsels that similar
measures will not be pursued often. The ACA was enacted only because
of a rare confluence of political factors, namely that the Democrats
occupied the White House and were a majority in both houses of Congress,
including enough of a majority in the Senate to overcome a Republican
218 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
219 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGETARY TREATMENT OF AN INDIVIDUAL
MANDATE TO BUY HEALTH INSURANCE 1-2 (1994), quoted in Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health and
Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1288 (1 Ith Cir. 2011).
220 Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1641 (2011), quoted in Florida,
648 F.3d at 1289.
221 Id. at 1642.
222 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997), quoted in Florida, 648 F.3d at 1289.
223 Va. Office Prot. & Advocacy, 131 S. Ct. at 1642 ("We are unaware that the necessary
conditions have ever presented themselves" to justify the application of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908), in the type of case under review),
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filibuster.224 Judging from the skepticism with which Americans have
greeted the mandate, and considering the general unpopularity of measures
that oblige people to spend money, mandates are unlikely to be imposed by
Congress on a regular basis.
Mandating that Americans buy something or act in ways that cost them
money actually has many precedents, including measures that were enacted
in the early Congress. As several commentators have mentioned, one of
the militia acts passed in 1792 required almost "every free able-bodied...
male citizen" between the ages eighteen and forty-five to both enroll in a
state militia and provide their own firearms capable of shooting a specified
shot weight, a supply of ammunition, bayonets (and swords, in the case of
221
officers), and related equipment. Most of these items would have to be
purchased. That this requirement was imposed under the auspices of the
Militia Clause does not deny its relevance to a mandate enacted under the
Commerce Clause. Congress evidently thought that obliging Americans to
arm themselves was a "necessary and proper" means for carrying out an
enumerated power. 26 The concurring judge on the Sixth Circuit panel
upholding the mandate nevertheless thought that the militia example gave
"analogy a bad name," as he perceived an obvious difference between
being required to "to defend the country's borders" and being forced to
take measures "to improve the availability of medical care., 227 This is a
curious argument as it rests on the assumption that there is something
special about the Militia Clause that supports a mandate to arm. The
Eleventh Circuit said as much, although it did not refer to the Militia Act.
According to its reasoning, there are have only been "a limited set of
personal mandates" imposed on Americans, namely "serving on juries,
registering for the draft, filing tax returns, and responding to the census."
These were said to be "duties owed to the government attendant to
citizenship, and they contain clear foundations in the constitutional text.,
228
This answer merely begs the question of what obligations are attendant
to citizenship, or more accurately, lawful residence in the United States.
224 Cf Virginia Office ofProt. & Advocacy, 131 S. Ct. at 1642 (downplaying the novelty of a law
because the "conditions will rarely coincide" to justify using it).
225 Act of May 8, 1792, § 1, 1 Stat. 271; see also Hall, supra note 122, at 1855-56; Akhil Amar,
The Lawfulness of Health-Care Reform 17-18 (Yale Law School, Research Paper # 228), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1856506.
226 The CBO was simply wrong in asserting that "[tihe government has never required people to
buy any good or service as a condition of lawful residence in the United States." CBO, THE
BUDGETARY TREATMENT OF AN INDIVIDUAL MANDATE TO BUY HEALTH INSURANCE 1 (1994),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/48xx/doc4816/doc38.pdf. That is
precisely what the Militia Act demanded.
227 Thomas More Law Ct. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 559 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J., concurring in
part).
228 Florida ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. United States Dep't Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1290
(11 th Cir. 2011), cert. granted in part 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011).
2012]
CONNECTICUT LA WREVIEW
The military draft, for example, applies to lawfully-resident aliens, who
also are obliged to file tax returns; further, there is no constitutional reason
why aliens could not be summoned as jurors. The text of the Constitution
provides little help. The Constitution does not mention a military draft,
and the militia was only authorized, not required, by the Militia Clause.
Requiring men to muster out with their own weapons was a way of
financing the militias. If Congress or the states had been richer, they could
have paid for this equipment from taxes. Likewise, it is reasonable to
request jury service of citizens in order to meet the constitutional
obligation to provide trial by jury, but this does not necessarily entail that
the unwilling be coerced to serve. Compensate them enough and there will
be more than enough volunteers. Similarly, it is reasonable to insist that
people file tax returns to facilitate revenue collection, but there is no
constitutional requirement that taxes be assessed in this manner-sales
taxes and customs duties, for example, require no returns, and these were
the prevalent forms of national taxation in the early republic. No doubt it
is helpful to require people to respond to census questions in order to
obtain an accurate enumeration, but strictly speaking the government could
count the people without such cooperation. It would just be much more
difficult, which is why the obligation is a "necessary and proper" means of
implementing the Census Clause. The same can be said of every
obligation mentioned in this paragraph.
The same line of reasoning supports an insurance mandate for
Americans who live in this country and thus can be expected to access
medical services here. There is a definite relationship between the obliga-
tion to procure insurance and the status of being alive and living lawfully
in the United States. Unlike voluntary activities such as driving a car or
operating a restaurant, the need for medical care is a consequence of being
alive. Not only will most people seek care to relieve their suffering, but it
may be rendered to them involuntarily, as when an unconscious person is
brought into an ER and the staff dispenses care without obtaining explicit
permission. As a society, Americans have decided through their elected
representatives in Congress and state legislatures to assure people that they
will receive emergency treatment regardless of whether they can pay.
Most Americans do not wish to live in a country where people with life-
threatening or painful conditions that can be treated are turned away from
hospitals for lack of funds. It may be, as the dissenting judge in the Sixth
Circuit litigation on the Act opined, that Congress is therefore partly
responsible for the conditions that have made insurance health care
unaffordable to millions. "The free-riding problem is substantially one of
Congress's own creation," he reasoned, because the national legislature has
used its constitutional powers to assure treatment even if cost-shifting will
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result. 22 9 Putting aside that other reasons contribute to cost-shifting besides
the federally-imposed obligation to render emergency care, there is nothing
constitutionally suspicious about Congress wielding its commerce powers
to counteract the ill effects of other constitutionally-justified laws. This is
a standard use of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Again, the motives for
enactment of a law are irrelevant so long as its ultimate object is
commercial regulation.
B. The Constitutionality of the Mandate as a Tax Measure
1. The General Welfare Clause as a Basis for Regulation
The government claims that there is an independent basis for
congressional power: the mandate's assessment is authorized as tax
justified under the General Welfare Clause.230  The penalty provision
certainly has one of the characteristics of a tax: it will extract billions of
dollars annually from taxpayers who pay the penalty because it is less than
the cost of insuring.23' So far no circuit court has agreed that it constitutes
a tax. The Sixth Circuit evaded the issue by finding sufficient legislative
power under the Commerce Clause, although it held that the mandate was
not a "tax" for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act.232 The Fourth Circuit,
while not reaching the merits of whether the mandate is a tax authorized by
the General Welfare Clause, nonetheless concluded that the lawsuit was
barred by the Anti-Injunction Act as "a pre-enforcement action seeking to
229 Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 572 n.3 (Graham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see id. at 563 (Sutton, J., concurring in part) ("When Congress guarantees a benefit for all (by
securing certain types of medical care), it may regulate that benefit (by requiring some to pay for it.").
230 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
231 The Congressional Budget Office and the congressional Joint Committee on Taxation
"estimate that total collections from those penalties will be about $4 billion per year over the 2017-
2019 period." CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, PAYMENTS OF PENALTIES FOR BEING UNINSURED
UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 1 (Apr. 22, 2010), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/ 113xx/docl 1355/individual-mandatepenalties-
04-22.pdf. See Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 651 F.3d at 539-40 (Sutton, J., concurring)
(stating that during "the first several years of the Act, if not throughout its existence," the penalty
"normally will cost less than medical insurance."). Justice Ginsburg thus was incorrect in asserting
during oral argument that "this is not a revenue-raising measure because, if it's successful, . . . nobody
will pay the penalty, and there will be no revenue to raise."). Transcript of Oral Argument, United
States Dep't Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, No. 11-398, at 19 (March 26, 2012) (statement of
Ginsburg, J.), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oralarguments/argument-transcripts/I 1-398-
Monday.pdf
232 Thomas More Law Cir., 651 F.3d at 539-40 (holding that the mandate is a "penalty" for
purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act), aff'g 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 895 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (declining to
reach whether mandate was a valid tax). Even if the mandate penalty is not a "tax" for purposes of the
Anti-Injunction Act, it still could be a "tax" for purposes of the General Welfare Clause, because the
Act does not apply to every tax, duty, impost or excise authorized by that clause. See 26 U.S.C. §
7421 (a) (2000) (listing exceptions).
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restrain the assessment of a tax., 233
The Eleventh Circuit is the only appeals court to reach the merits of
this issue, and the majority concluded "that the individual mandate is not a
tax, but rather a penalty," and hence not an independent basis for
congressional action. 4 By its account, the mandate was not adopted "to
raise revenue for the public fisc, but rather to, among other things, reduce
the number of the uninsured and to create what Congress perceived to be
effective health insurance markets that make health insurance more widely
available. 235 Consequently, it "appears in every important respect to be
'punishment for an unlawful Act or omission,' which defines the very
'concept of penalty.' ' 236 The court was impressed that Congress "carefully
selected" the word "penalty" 237 to describe the mandate, instead of "tax," a
term employed elsewhere in the Act to describe monetary extractions and
which early versions of the ACA bill had used to depict the mandate.238
True, the mandate is located in the IRS Code, but not every exaction in the
code is a "tax" enacted by virtue of the General Welfare Clause, and the
IRS Code itself warns not to draw any "inference, implication, or
presumption of legislative construction" by the fact that a requirement is
placed under that title.239 The tax code "contains all sorts of provisions for
payment of interest and penalties that are not taxes.' 24o
The plaintiffs in the case pending before the Court on the ACA argue
that the mandate cannot "itself be upheld as a tax,"241 inasmuch as it is a
"legal '[r]equirement' that covered individuals 'shall' obtain insurance.'
242
233 Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391, 397-98 (4th Cir. 2011), vacating 753 F. Supp. 2d
611, 629 (W.D. Va. 2010) (for purposes of Anti-Injunction Act, "exactions imposed under the Act for
violations of the employer and individual coverage provisions is that of regulatory penalties, not
taxes"); see also Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 788 (E.D. Va. 2010)
(holding that for purpose of the Ant-Injunction Act the mandate "in form and substance," is "a penalty
as opposed to a tax."), vacated 656 F.3d 253, 269 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that Virginia lacked standing
to challenge individual mandate). However, "the fact that the Anti-Injunction Act applies does not
necessarily mean the tax penalty is permissible under the Taxing Clause." Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661
F.3d 1,48 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
234 Florida ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. United States Dep't Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1290
(1 th Cir. 201 1), cert. granted in part 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011).235
1 Id. at 1316-17.
236 Id. at 1319 (quoting United States v. Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of Utah, 518 U.S. 213,
224 (1996)).237 Id. at 1315.
238 See id. at 13 16-20 (discussing the designation of other provisions in the Affordable Care Act
as taxes and detailing the legislative history of the individual mandate).
239 Id. at 1319 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 7806(b)); see also id. at 1320 ("[O]ther chapters of the
Internal Revenue Code include penalty provisions as well.").
240 Erik M. Jensen, The Individual Mandate and the Taxing Power, TAX NOTES TODAY, Jan. 4,
2012, at 98.
241 Brief for Private Respondents supra note 191, at 63 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a)) (emphasis
added).
242 Id. (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a)).
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Americans may not "ignore that requirement" by "pay[ing] the non-
compliance sanction.' ,24' But they certainly can do exactly that. There are
no other consequences. Those who choose to incur the penalty rather than
insure will be justified in thinking they have met their obligation to fellow
Americans. They have compensated society for the risk they present.
Commentators similarly contend that the mandate's "penalty" amounts
to a fee for self-insuring by doing nothing. 244 This is a variation of the
argument against basing the mandate on the Commerce Clause because it
supposedly regulates inactivity. The answer is similar in both contexts: the
ones being regulated or taxed are doing something: living in the United
States without insurance and usually without sufficient assets to bear
significant medical expenses. Every one of these self-insurers presents an
actuarial risk that will be borne by others; predictably, some will incur
more medical debt than they can afford . 45 With good reason, the penalty
is characterized by the act as a "shared responsibility payment," imposed
on the entire group to account for risk they present to society.246
At the oral argument before the Court on the constitutionality of the
mandate, the attorney for the states maintained vociferously that the
minimum insurance policy required by the ACA includes coverage that far
exceeds the cost shifting that the uninsured produce. The minimum plan
was not limited to "emergency care and catastrophic insurance coverage.
But it covers everything, soup to nuts, and all sorts of other things. 247
There is a germ of truth in his statement: the "essential health benefits" that
insurance plans must cover include emergency care, hospitalization,
maternity and newborn care, mental health and drug treatment, prescription
drugs, rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices, lab services,
preventive and wellness services, chronic disease management, and
pediatric care (including dental and vision care).2 4 8  The flaw in this
position is the erroneous assumption that cost-shifting is only the result of
catastrophic costs. Given the financial difficulties of many American
families, much smaller medical bills can be beyond their ability to pay.
The erstwhile plaintiff in the Florida litigation, Mary Brown, defaulted on
243 Id. at 11.
244 Steven J. Willis & Nakku Chung, Oy Yes, The Healthcare Penalty is Unconstitutional, 129
TAX NOTES 725, 727 (2010) (arguing that a tax cannot be based on doing "nothing").
245 See Transcript of Oral Argument, Dep't Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, No. 11-398, at 56-
57 (Mar. 27, 2012) (statement of Kennedy, J.), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
oralarguments/argumenttranscripts/i 1-398-Tuesday.pdf ("It is true that the noninsured young adult
is, in fact, an actuarial reality insofar as our allocation of health services, insofar as the way health
insurance companies figure risks.").
246 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (b) (2010).
247 Transcript of Oral Argument at 75, Dep't Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, (No. 11-398),
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oralarguments/argumenttranscripts/l 1-398-Tuesday.pdf.
241 See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300gg-6, 18022(b)(1) (West 2003 & Supp. 2011).
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only $4500 in health care costs.249 Congress could rationally conclude that
cost-shifting is a phenomenon not limited to extraordinary expenses. In
any event, it is not limited to imposing taxes that precisely correlate with
the social costs created by individual taxpayers.
Congress could have achieved the same result by raising the general
income tax rate for all taxpayers, and giving a credit to them if they have
obtained a minimum level of insurance. Since that unquestionably would
be constitutional, it should be possible to accomplish the same result by
taxing the uninsured directly. The federal tax code is loaded with
exemptions and credits that encourage or discourage specific actions or
inactions. Buy a home and the mortgage interest is deductible. Invest in a
qualified IRA and defer taxation on the funds until they are withdrawn,
unless this occurs before age fifty-nine and a half, in which case there is a
ten percent penalty.250 This encourages saving for retirement, and it does
so by requiring a person to purchase and hold investments. A person may
also shelter retirement income in a qualified return plan, provided the plan
requires the individual to start receiving distributions at age seventy and a
half, thus forcing behavior the taxpayer might want to avoid.25' One could
go on with similar examples for pages, as it is the nature of the current tax
code to grant credits and deductions for specified actions or inactions.
These allowances often are beneath the public radar, and they remain in
effect long after the issue has faded from popular notice. The reasons for
granting these allowances are regarded as political considerations by the
Court, having no bearing on constitutionality.25 2  "Legislatures have
especially broad latitude in creating classifications and distinctions in tax
statutes. 253 The Court long ago declared in Sonzinsky v. United States that
"a tax is not any the less a tax because it has a regulatory effect . ,,254 It
refuses to look "into the hidden motives" of Congress and inquire whether
the tax in reality was "a regulation of behavior enacted 'under the guise of
taxation. 2
55
Over the years, the Supreme Court has sustained numerous laws as
"taxes" under the General Welfare Clause even when their primary
purpose obviously was "to curtail and hinder" some type of action rather
249 See Savage, supra note 189.
250 26 U.S.C. § 72(t) (2006).
251 Id. § 401(a)(9)(C).
252 See Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1940) (footnotes omitted) ("[Iln taxation, even
more than in other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom in classification" for purposes of
applying the Fourteenth Amendment.).
253 Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983) (upholding a tax
subsidy for certain types of lobbying, rejecting First Amendment objections).
254 Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937).
211 Id. at 514.
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than to raise revenues.256 Even if a tax is "so excessive that it will bring
about the destruction of [the taxpayer's] business, . . . standing alone,
this... furnish[es] no juridical ground for striking down a taxing Act" as a
regulatory penalty in disguise.211 "It is axiomatic," the Court posited in
1953, "that the power of Congress to tax is extensive and sometimes falls
with crushing effect on businesses deemed unessential or inimical to the
public welfare, or where, as in dealings with narcotics, the collection of the
tax also is difficult."258 The test for determining the difference between
taxes and penalties is highly deferential to Congress: "Unless there are
provisions, extraneous to any tax need, courts are without authority to limit
the exercise of the taxing power.,
259
Sonzinsky, for example, approved a tax on manufacturers, importers
and dealers of firearms commonly used by criminals-machine guns,
sawed-off long guns and silencers-as well as an excise on each transfer of
such weapons.260 The amount of money it produced in 1935 was trivial-
$5400-in comparison to the billions projected from the ACA
assessments; it plainly was designed not to produce revenues but to
regulate a segment of the firearms industry.26' In United States v.
Sanchez,262 the Court upheld the Marihuana Tax Act, which levied $100
per ounce of marijuana sold or otherwise transferred by a person without a
special federal license (or, in current dollars, over $900).263 This amount,
needless to say, was beyond the reach of most. Sellers also had to register
with the government and it was illegal for buyers to purchase from
unregistered dealers, which would help limit access to marijuana to those
with "legitimate" reasons to purchase marihuana such as physicians and
patients. Those with a license paid a negligible tax of one dollar per
ounce,264 which showed that the law was aimed at discouraging "illicit
256 United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 27 (1953).
257 A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40,47 (1934).
251 Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 28.
259 Id. at 31.
260 See Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 511-12, 514 (affirming a Court of Appeals decision stating that a
$200 annual license tax on dealers in firearms was constitutionally within Congress's taxing power).
261 See id at 514 n.1 ("The $200 tax was paid by 27 dealers in 1934, and by 22 dealers in 1935.").
262 340 U.S. 42 (1950).
263 The Consumer Price Index value of $100 in 1950 equates to $906 in 2010. See Relative Value,
MEASURINGWORTH, http://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/relativevalue.php (last visited Apr.
11, 2012) (providing an online historical value calculator).
264 Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 238, § 7(a), 50 Stat. 551 (repealed 1970). In United
States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 90, 95 (1919), the Court likewise upheld a law making it illegal to
"produce, import, manufacture, compound, deal in, dispense, sell, distribute, or give away" opium,
cocoa leaves, or their derivatives, without paying a one dollar per year federal tax. The "aim" of the
nominal tax was to assure that sales of these drugs were made pursuant to "legitimate prescriptions of
physicians," but this was irrelevant: "The act may not be declared unconstitutional because its effect
may be to accomplish another purpose as well as the raising of revenue." Id. at 94. In Alston v. United
States, 274 U.S. 289, 292-94 (1927), the Court sustained a conviction for "purchasing morphine and
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uses."265  All purchases were to be made on forms supplied by the
Treasury, thus identifying buyers and seller to authorities. The statute's
purposes were to "raise revenue and at the same time render extremely
difficult the acquisition of marihauna by persons who desire it for illicit
uses," as well as "publicizing dealings in marihuana in order to tax and
control the traffic effectively.,
266
That the stated purpose of the marijuana tax was regulatory made no
difference because "a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it
regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed., 267 It
also was irrelevant that "the revenue obtained is obviously negligible.,
268
Nor did it matter that the Act made it illegal to sell marijuana without a
license, transfer it without paying a fee, or buy it from unlicensed
dealers.269
Three years after Sanchez, the Court, in United States v. Kahriger,
approved the federal Gamblers' Occupational Tax Act, which imposed a
fairly modest tax of fifty dollars on bookies ("persons in the business of
accepting wagers"), but required them to register with the tax authorities, 270
which exposed them to prosecution for engaging in an activity that was
unlawful under state or federal law. A ten percent tax on each wage also
was imposed, to be collected and paid by the bookie. Failure to register or
pay the tax was punishable by a fine of up to five thousand dollars. Again,
the Court said that "a federal excise tax does not cease to be valid merely
because it discourages or deters the activities taxed. Nor is the tax invalid
because the revenue obtained its negligible. 27'
As Sanchez, Kahriger, and other cases show, for over seventy years
the Court has been untroubled by taxes that were structured to discourage
consumption of certain products and services, as well as the businesses
cocaine from unstamped packages," even though the federal tax was a nominal one cent per ounce.
"They do not absolutely prohibit buying or selling; have produced substantial revenue; contain nothing
to indicate that by colorable use of taxation Congress is attempting to invade the reserved powers of the
States. The impositions are not penalties." Id. at 294; see also Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254
U.S. 189, 190-91, 195 (1920) (sustaining conviction of a physician for selling opium without using a
form provided by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue), overruled by Funk v. United States, 290
U.S. 371 (1933).
261 Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 42, 43.
266 Id. at 43 (quoting S. Rep. No. 900, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., at 3).
267 Id. at 44.
268 id.
269 Marihuana Tax Act, § 4(b), 50 Stat. at 556 (1937) (repealed 1970).
270 United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 23-25, 31 (1953), overruled in part Marchetti v.
United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
271 Id. at 28. Kahriger was later overruled, not because of a new interpretation of the General
Welfare Clause, but because the Court held that its requirement to register as a gambler compelled self-
incrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 54 (1968).
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involving them.272 Many years earlier, the Court upheld a federal tax on
selling oleomargarine "colored to look like butter,, 273 notwithstanding that
the tax rate was vastly higher than for uncolored oleomargarine-"so large
as to destroy the business of manufacturing oleomargarine artificially
colored to look like butter." 274 It made no difference that the ostensible
objective of the tax was to suppress a product Congress thought had the
tendency "to deceive the public into buying it for butter," or that the real
purpose was to aid the dairy industry in suppressing a competing
product. 275 Facially, it was an excise tax, and the Court would not question
the motive for enacting it:
[T]he judiciary is without authority to avoid an Act of
Congress exerting the taxing power, even in a case where,
to the judicial mind, it seems that Congress had, in putting
such power in motion, abused its lawful authority by
levying a tax which was unwise or oppressive, or the result
of the enforcement of which might be to indirectly affect
subjects not within the powers delegated to Congress.276
2. The Problem of Distinguishing Between Taxes and Penalties
Theoretically, there is a constitutional difference between taxes
properly laid under the General Welfare Clause and penalties for violating
laws. However, the Court has held in only a handful of cases that a
272 See Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 27 (citing examples); see also e.g., Nigro v. United States, 276 U.S.
332, 354 (1928) (upholding tax on sale of opiates, requiring that purchases be ordered via forms from
the U.S. Commissioner of Revenue); Alston v. United States, 274 U.S. 289, 293-94 (1927) (upholding
criminal penalty for selling cocaine or morphine without tax stamps evidencing payment of one cent
per ounce of narcotics).
273 McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 28 (1904).274 Id. at 62.
275 Id. at 63; see also Geoffrey P. Miller, Public Choice at the Dawn of the Special Interest State:
The Story of Butter and Margarine, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 83, 88-89 (1989) (describing origin of the
"butter lobby" and the dairy industry's efforts to suppress oleomargarine through legislation and
litigation); Note, The Oleomargarine Controversy, 33 VA. L. REV. 631, 632 (1947) (detailing "onerous
and sometimes vicious legislation" against oleomargarine sales).
276 McCray, 195 U.S. at 63-64; see also United States v. One Ford Coupe Auto., 272 U.S. 321,
324-25, 327 (1926) (upholding forfeiture of car "being used for the purpose of depositing or
concealing tax-unpaid illicit liquors with the intent to defraud the United States of the taxes imposed
thereon," even though "since the National Prohibition Act, there has been no way in which the tax
could be so paid on intoxicating liquor made for beverage purposes."); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S.
(8 Wall.) 533, 548 (1869) (upholding a ten percent tax on notes issued by state banks, even though the
rate allegedly was "so excessive as to indicate a purpose on the part of Congress to destroy the
franchise of the bank . . . .The power to tax may be exercised oppressively upon persons, but the
responsibility of the legislature is not to the courts, but to the people by whom its members are
elected."); License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462 (5 Wall.) 462, 474-75 (1866) (sustaining convictions for
selling lottery tickets and liquor without obtaining federal license that required payment of a special
tax, even though these activities violated state law).
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purported tax actually was a regulatory penalty, and all were in a short
span of years from the early 1920s until the mid-1930s, the same period
when it issued a series of now-discredited decisions finding important
federal regulatory laws to exceed the Commerce Clause.277 Prior to 1920,
the Court routinely approved revenue measures that plainly were aimed at
influencing behavior rather than raising money.278 Since 1937, no case has
invalidated a revenue measure on the ground that it was a penalty disguised
as a tax.
The most prominent of the older cases finding that a putative tax
amounted to a penalty is the Child Labor Tax Case, in which the Court
held that an exaction for knowingly employing minors was a penalty, not a
tax. Writing for a nearly unanimous Court, Chief Justice Taft posed the
question this way: "Does this law impose a tax with only that incidental
restraint and regulation which a tax must inevitably involve? Or does it
regulate by the use of the so-called tax as a penalty? ' 279 Taft acknowl-
edged that true taxes can be imposed "with the incidental motive of
discouraging [actions] by making their continuance onerous,... [b]ut there
comes a time in the extension of the penalizing features of the so-called tax
when it loses its character as such and becomes a mere penalty, with the
characteristics of regulation and punishment.
280
The Child Labor Tax Act was a penalty, Taft concluded, because it
exacted ten percent of the entire annual profits earned by business if at any
point during the year it employed minors below certain ages or in excess of
specified hours to make products (the exact limits varied by industry).
This was "a heavy exaction for a departure from a detailed and specified
course of conduct in business.', 28 ' The amount was not "proportioned in
any degree to the extent or frequency of the departures, but is to be paid by
the employer in full measure whether he employs 500 children for a year,
or employs only one for a day., 282  Scienter, usually "associated with
penalties, not with taxes," was required as a condition for being liable to
pay the assessment: it was a complete defense that the business owner did
277 See, e.g., Carter v. Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 278, 288-89 (1936) (invalidating Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act of 1935 as unauthorized by both the General Welfare Clause and the Commerce
Clause); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 525, 550-51 (1935) (holding a
"code of fair competition" for the poultry industry developed under the National Industrial Recovery
Act to exceed Congress' commerce powers); R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 374 (1935)
(striking mandatory pension plan for railroad workers as unauthorized by Commerce Clause); Hammer
v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276-77 (1918) (voiding Child Labor Act as beyond the commerce power).
278 See Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the Power to Destroy: A Theory of the Tax Power
for a Court that Limits the Commerce Power, VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 15-16).
279 Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20, 36 (1922).
28 Id. at 38.
"' Id. at 36.
282 id.
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"not know the child is within the named age limit, he is not to pay.' 283
Enforcement of the "tax" was the responsibility of both the Department of
Treasury, the agency "normally charged with the collection of taxes," and
by officials of the Department of Labor, "whose normal function is the
advancement and protection of the welfare of the workers."
284
The Child Labor Tax Act ranks as one of the most flagrant examples of
congressional chutzpah in American history. Less than a year before it
was enacted, the Court in Hammer v. Dagenhart declared the Child Labor
Act unconstitutional as exceeding Congress' powers under the Commerce
Clause.285 Congress essentially reenacted the voided child labor law under
the pretext of it being a taxing measure: liability for "the so-called tax" was
based on exactly the same conduct that gave rise to a violation of the Child
Labor Act.286 This was too much for the Court to swallow: "Its prohibitory
and regulatory effect and purpose are palpable," Taft wrote, "[a]ll others
can see and understand this. How can we properly shut our minds to it?"
287
Even Justices Holmes, Brandeis and McKenna, who vigorously dissented
in Hammer v. Dagenhart, joined Taft's opinion.
Very few cases have reached similar conclusions, and again, all of
them were decided in a decade and a half during the early 1920s to the
mid-1930s. 288  In a 1922 case, Hill v. Wallace, the Court found
unconstitutional the Future Trading Act, with another nearly unanimous
opinion from Taft. The Act imposed a prohibitively high "tax" on futures
contracts for grain unless they were sold on boards of trade or they
submitted to extensive regulation by federal agencies: "The manifest
purpose of the tax is to compel boards of trade to comply with regulations,
many of which can have no relevancy to the collection of the tax at all."
2 89
A comparable result was reached in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., a 1936 case
holding that an assessment of fifteen percent of the value of bituminous
coal mined was "clearly not a tax but ... a penalty to compel compliance
with the regulatory provisions of the act."'290 There was a ninety percent
rebate if the business, whether it was in interstate commerce or not,
submitted to detailed federal regulations, including a minimum price for
coal sales. "The whole purpose of the exaction is to coerce what is called
an agreement-which, of course, it is not, for it lacks the essential element
283 Id. at 36-37.
214 Id. at 37.
285 247 U.S. 251,276-77 (1918), overruled United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116-17 (1941).
286 Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 39.
211 Id. at 37.
288 See Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 562 (1922) (holding that an assessment on selling liquor in
violation of the National Prohibition Act was not a "tax" because it "clearly involves the idea of
punishment for infraction of the law-the definite function of a penalty").
289 Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 66 (1922).
290 Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 288-89 (1936).
of consent.,
291
In these two decades, the Court was also skeptical, at times, of taxes
imposed only when some substantive law was violated. In Lipke v.
Lederer, another 1922 case, the Court ruled that an assessment on selling
liquor in violation of the National Prohibition Act was not a valid "tax"
because it "clearly involves the idea of punishment for infraction of the
law-the definite function of a penalty.",292 The assessment "lacks all the
ordinary characteristics of a tax, whose primary function 'is to provide for
the support of the government .... ,,,293 "Evidence of crime ... is essential
to assessment" of the supposed tax.294 In United States v. Constantine,
decided in 1935, the Court invalidated a $1000 license fee for sellers of
alcohol in violation of state law.295  "The point here is that the exaction
is... in addition to any the state may decree for the violation of a state
law," Justice Roberts wrote for the majority.296  "The condition of the
imposition is the commission of a crime. This, together with the amount of
the tax, is again significant of penal and prohibitory intent rather than the
gathering of revenue. 297
Although the Child Labor Tax Case and similar decisions have not
been formally overruled, in more recent times the Court has said that it had
"abandoned" the "distinctions between regulatory and revenue-raising
taxes," citing the 1937 decision in Sonzinsky for authority. 298 The Court
reached this conclusion because over the years it dismissed all of the bases
used by these older cases to distinguish taxes from penalties. A measure
that produced a regular flow of money to the government was considered a
tax even if Congress admitted that it had regulatory objectives.2 99 It made
291 Id. at 289.
292 259 U.S. 557, 562 (1922).
293 Id. at 562 (citing O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 324 (1914) in noting "[t]he term 'penalty'
involves the idea of punishment for the infraction of the law").
294 Lipke, 259 U.S. at 562.
295 296 U.S. 287, 288-90, 297 (1935).
296 Id. at 296.
... Id. at 295.
298 Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 741 n.12 (1974) (citing Sonzinsky v. United States,
300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937)). As recently as 1994, the Court cited the Child Labor Tax Case with
apparent approval in the context of a claim that a "tax" was a penalty for double jeopardy purposes. In
Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 778 (1994), a case on the double
jeopardy implications of a state tax, the Court cited with approval its decision in A. Magnano Co. v.
Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 46 (1934), noting that it relied on the Child Labor Tax Case. "[W]e have also
recognized that 'there comes a time in the extension of the penalizing features of the so-called tax when
it loses its character as such and becomes a mere penalty with the characteristics of regulation and
punishment."').
299 See supra text accompanying notes 250-55, 260-76 (citing examples of taxes imposed by
Congress to further specific regulatory regime).
CONNECTICUT LA W REVIEW [Vol. 44:1133
ON SLIPPERY CONSTITUTIONAL SLOPES
no difference if the amount of the tax was large or small. 00 "As a general
matter, the unlawfulness of an activity does not prevent its taxation," 30' as
the Court has "repeatedly indicated. '' 30 2 Even Constantine acknowledged
that if "the exaction . . . was laid to raise revenue its validity is beyond
question notwithstanding the fact that the conduct of the business taxed
was in violation of law.
303
The basis of these older cases overturning laws for not being taxes was
a seemingly reasonable proposition: "Congress could not use its taxing
power in this indirect way to regulate business not within federal
control. ' '3° The problem with this principle lies in the word "indirect,"
because the Court also allowed that a valid tax "may incidentally
discourage some in the harmful use of the thing taxed."30 5  The line
between a tax that incidentally affects conduct and a penalty intended to
influence behavior was hard to draw distinctly. "In that area of abstract
ideas, a final definition of the line between state and federal power has
baffled judges and legislators," the Court admitted in 1953.306
Distinguishing between the two effects in a principled manner proved to be
daunting, for the same reason that similar terminology failed in setting
limits on Congress' Commerce Clause powers. "[T]he right of taxation,
where it exists, is necessarily unlimited in its nature. It carries with it
inherently the power to embarrass and destroy. 30 7 "As is well known, the
3W See supra text accompanying notes 260-65, 270-71 & 274 (citing examples of both large and
small taxes imposed by Congress to further specific regulatory regime).
311 Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 778; see id. at 781 (stating that "while a high tax rate and deterrent
purpose lend support to the characterization of the drug tax as punishment, these features, in and of
themselves, do not necessarily render the tax punitive," although they are relevant factors in
determining whether a "tax" is punitive); James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 213 (1961) (holding
that under Internal Revenue Code "embezzled funds must be included in the 'taxable income' of an
embezzler in the year in which [the funds] are misappropriated ...."). In Kurth Ranch, the factors that
led the Court to find the tax was a fine for double jeopardy purposes were the "remarkably high tax"
rate, the fact that the tax was "conditioned on the commission of a crime" ("the taxed activity is
completely forbidden"), that liability attaches only after arrest, and that it purported to be a property tax
although it was "levied on goods that the taxpayer neither owns nor possesses when the tax is
imposed." Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 780-83.
302 Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39,44 (1968).
303 United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 293 (1935). "The United States has the power to
levy excises upon occupations, and to classify them for this purpose; and need look only to the fact of
the exercise of the occupation or calling taxed, regardless of whether such exercise is permitted or
prohibited by the laws of the United States or by those of a state." Id (footnotes omitted).
304 Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 32 (1923) (emphasis added).
305 Nigro v. United States, 276 U.S. 332, 354 (1928).
306 United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 29 (1953), overruled in part Marchetti v. United
States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
307 McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 57 (1904) (quoting Austin v. Aldermen, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 694, 699 (1868)) ((internal quotation marks omitted)). The same was found to be true of the
Commerce Clause in post-1937 cases: "The power of Congress over interstate commerce is plenary and
complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than
are prescribed in the Constitution." Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. I11, 124 (1942) (quoting United
20121
constitutional restraints on taxing are few.,' 30 8  There are but two:
"Congress cannot tax exports, and it must impose direct taxes by the rule
of apportionment and indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity.,
30 9
In applying the General Welfare Clause, the Court does assume that
there is a theoretical difference between penalties and taxes, but that has
not enabled it to develop doctrines that separate the two consistently in
practice. This is not so odd in American constitutional law, which has
produced a number of theoretical constructs that are assumed to exist even
though they cannot be actualized as enforceable doctrines. For example,
the nondelegation doctrine assumes that there is a distinction between non-
delegable legislative power and properly constrained delegations to
agencies. 310  Despite the enormous number of statutes delegating
congressional authority to agencies, however, there are only two cases in
which the Court set aside laws on the ground that they contained excessive
delegations, and both were decided in 1935.31 Small wonder why. Once
the justices recognized that Congress could enable agencies to exercise
powers that either it or one of the other two branches could carry out, they
could not articulate a rule that determined when Congress gave agencies
too much independent power. Hence, the Court has "almost never felt
qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of
policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law. 312
Likewise, after the Court granted that taxes can be large or small and have
admitted regulatory purposes, it became daunting to cull out the ones that
exceeded legislative authority. If not exactly a nonjusticiable political
question, the line between taxes and penalties is not one amenable to
"judicially discoverable and manageable standards" that can be reliably
applied.313
Professors Cooter and Siegel argue that there are two "pure" or "ideal
types" of taxes and regulations.31 4 These are identified by the presence or
States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Once
an economic measure of the reach of the power granted to Congress in the Commerce Clause is
accepted, questions of federal power cannot be decided simply by finding the activity in question to be
'production' nor can consideration of its economic effects be foreclosed by calling them 'indirect."' Id.
30 Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 28.309 Id. (quoting License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462, 471 (1866)).
310 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) ("In a delegation challenge, the
constitutional question is whether the statute has delegated legislative power to the agency.").
m" See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). In Whitman, the Court said through Justice Scalia that Panama
Refining "provided literally no guidance for the exercise of discretion," and Schechter Poultry involved
a law that "conferred authority to regulate the entire economy on the basis of no more precise a
standard than stimulating the economy by assuring 'fair competition."' Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474.
312 Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474-75 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
313 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
314 Cooter & Siegel, supra note 278 (manuscript at 4, 28 n. 139).
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absence of three characteristics: (1) that it is so excessive in amount that
"almost everyone" would not suffer the cost; (2) the requirement that there
be a "certain mental state," such as intentionality, as an element of liability;
and (3) the amount of the exaction "increase[s] with repetition of the
assessed conduct., 31 5 If all three are present in legislation that raises
revenue through compulsory exactions, then it counts as a penalty for
purposes of the General Welfare Clause; if none are in evidence, it is a tax.
When only some of these factors are present, courts confront "a hard case"
that must be decided by analyzing the incentives created by an exaction.
316
Courts should focus on whether "the exaction raise[s] revenues and
dampen[s] the conduct, or . . . prevent[s] the conduct[.] ' '317 In "close
cases," the measure should be upheld due to "the presumption of
constitutionality" afforded congressional enactments.31 8
Like other essentialist theories, the one proposed by Cooter and Siegel
suffers from two problems. First, it assumes that the attributes they
identify are the only ones relevant to determining if a law imposes a tax or
a penalty. However, other factors arguably are relevant. To list a few:
whether the measure exacts significant sums from taxpayers, particularly
when it is a predictable revenue stream; whether the amount of the
assessment is small compared to the penalties for not paying; whether there
is a possibility of incarceration for disobeying the requirement; whether the
violation of law occurred as part a discrete set of events (such as common
law crimes), rather than the failure to do something for a period of time; or
whether the IRS, the usual revenue-gathering agency, is collecting the
money.
Second, there are many instances in which speakers have referred to
the laws under review as either imposing taxes or penalties, even though
not all of these factors were present. The Child Labor Tax Act extracted a
ten percent tax on the net profits of companies using child labor, which did
not increase with recidivism, yet the Court called it a penalty. Many
criminal penalties are so low, and the chance of being detected and cited by
the authorities is so unlikely, that many people assume the risk.
Jaywalking incurs a penalty, but not so large that everyone is deterred.
The charges for parking on public streets are either taxes or user fees; a
failure to pay a ticket for not paying the fee incurs a penalty. Yet cities
receive a regular flow of income from parking fines, and often depend on
the money to balance their budgets, which makes them operate like taxes.
Returning a book late to the library produces a penalty, but many are
willing to pay the small penalty in order to finish the last chapter, in effect
315 d. at 36.
316 Id. at 37 n.160.
3 17 id.
3
' Id. at 37.
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paying a rental fee for the overdue days. Libraries figure them into their
budgets. Some exactions have been called "taxes" by the Court, even
though the amount assessed was so high as to effectively ban that which is
taxed. The power to tax has been recognized as "the power to destroy.
319
It is true that taxes do not impose obligations based on specific mental
states, but neither does the ACA.
"Penalties" and "taxes" are not things-in-this-world. Rather than
referring to physical objects, these terms express concepts. Humans
constantly use words to name objects, concepts, and mental states,
assigning different meanings depending on the context in which they are
used. We say "chair" variously to mean something to sit on, the head of an
organization, the person presiding over a meeting, a place or title of
authority (as in the position of a bishop or the place where a religious
leader resides or carries out their duties), an endowed professorship, a
position in an orchestra, and a means of executing the condemned, to
mention only some possible modem connotations and omitting the
considerable number of now obsolete uses. All of these instances have
elements shared by the others. Yet there is not a single attribute of
"chairness" in existence. In speaking, people may be fooled into thinking
that when they use a word like "chair" they are referencing an ideal type of
chair. Naming is not describing.320 People understand the meaning of a
word from its use. Words have "meaning only as part of a sentence. 321
So it is with "penalties" and "taxes." They are meaningful words despite
our inability to describe the ideal type of either one. Judicial opinions use
them constantly and sometimes inconsistently, but people generally
understand what the judges mean from the context.
In constitutional law, courts and commentators have a penchant for
describing rules and principles as lists of factors. For example,
"obscenity" consists of three elements; "commercial speech" has four; the
requirements of procedural "due process" depend on balancing three
factors.322 Whether state action violates the Establishment Clause depends
on a three-part test.323 This is an effort to depict the ideal types of these
319 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819). Professors Cooter and Siegel
deny that this is so. Cooter & Siegel, supra note 278, (manuscript at 39).
320 See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 24e (G.E.M. Anscombe trans.,
3d. ed. 1963) (1958) ("For naming and describing do not stand of the same level: naming is a
preparation for a description."); id. at 21e ("[l]t makes no sense at all to speak absolutely of the 'simple
parts of a chair."').
321 Id. at 10e (attributing remark to Friedrich Frege).
322 See Miller v. California, (obscenity); Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (commercial speech); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 333-34 (1976) (due process).
323 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). But see Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 679 (1984) ("[W]e have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be confined to any single test
or criterion in this sensitive area.").
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concepts involved by listing their essential attributes. Yet courts have
struggled to describe the essential characteristics of these terms. All agree
on labeling certain scenarios: the person who is executed by the state
suffers a punishment; incarceration after conviction is a punishment,
whereas pretrial confinement during the pendency of criminal proceedings
is not punishment; likewise, civil commitment of mentally ill persons is not
punishment, but harm prevention. The yearly tribute the people pay to the
federal government on or about April 15 is called a tax; failure to file on
time exposes the taxpayer to a penalty.
That everyone agrees on these examples may lull us into thinking that
we know the "ideal types" of these words, when what we comprehend is
the meaning people ascribe to their various uses. Judges and legislators
have been "baffled" in the "hard cases" precisely because they involve
situations with elements common to both penalties and taxes. Cooter and
Siegel would resolve these mixed situations by asking whether the "the
exaction raise[s] revenues and dampen[s] the conduct, or ... prevent[s] the
conduct., 324 But this merely restates the question of where to draw the line
between penalties and taxes. Penalties also "raise revenues," whereas
some taxes produce very little. Both taxes and penalties can dampen as
well as prevent behavior.
The Court's post-1937 cases express increasing skepticism over the
prospect of cleanly separating taxes from penalties for purposes of the
General Welfare Clause. If a measure produces a stream of payments to
the government, large or small, in modern times that has been the end of
the inquiry. Other constitutional provisions limit congressional taxation,
such as the clauses prohibiting double jeopardy,325 compulsory self-
incrimination,326 and bills of attainder,327 as well as the First Amendment's
ban on taxes that "single[] out the press for special treatment.', 328 These
temper the tax power somewhat, but the main constraint is political:
members of Congress must face the people.
If the pre-1937 cases on the General Welfare Clause have any vitality,
they should be reserved for situations like the Child Labor Tax Act in
324 Cooter & Siegel, supra note 278 (manuscript at 37 n. 160).
325 See supra note 301.
326 See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 60-61 (1968) (holding that assertion of privilege
against self-incrimination provided complete defense to charges for failure to register with tax
authorities in connection with wagering activities). Marchetti expressly found that the occupational tax
on gamblers was itself valid under the General Welfare Clause. See id. at 44, 61.
327 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3. A law purporting to tax named individuals probably would be a
bill of attainder; cf United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) (striking down law curtailing
compensation of three named federal employees accused of disloyalty as an unconstitutional bill of
attainder). The result presumably would be the same if Congress had taxed the three named
employees.
328 Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Rev., 460 U.S. 575, 582 (1983).
Minneapolis Star involved state law, but the same result would hold if Congress had enacted the tax.
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which Congress flagrantly attempted an end-run around a decision limiting
its powers to legislate pursuant to Article I. One can imagine that the
Court would not be amused if Congress had tried to circumvent Lopez by
enacting a "tax" on anyone knowingly carrying a firearm near a school, or
evade Morrison by passing a law forbidding sexual assault on women
without paying a "tax., 329  Or, as in Constantine, if Congress assessed a
"tax" simply for violating state law, at least when it was unlikely that many
(if any) would pay the tax. (The Court would today strike such a tax as
violating the privilege against self-incrimination.) 330  It also may be
necessary to distinguish between a "tax" and a "penalty" for other
purposes: when applying the Anti-Injunction Act or other jurisdictional
statutes, 33' in judging if an assessment amounts to double jeopardy, 3 2 for
deciding whether an assessment is a "Tax or Duty" barred by the Export
Clause333 or the Import-Export Clause,334 and determining whether a bill in
Congress must originate in the House of Representatives when it is "for
raising Revenue. 335  These settings involve materially different
considerations than the question of Article I power to tax. All of them
329 See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 278, (manuscript at 25) ("It is very unlikely that the Court
would uphold such an exaction as a permissible use of the tax power and allow Congress to undermine
Lopez so easily.").330 See supra note 326.
331 See, e.g., United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 574-75 (1931) (holding that action for
nonpayment of an assessment for selling liquor in violation of the National Prohibition Act was a
"penalty" and thus barred by the Willis-Campbell Act); Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605, 611,
613 (1903) (concluding that monetary assessment for importing goods worth more than their declared
value was "penal in its nature" because "the sum is not imposed for any purpose of revenue, but is in
addition to the duties imposed upon the particular article imported," and hence the federal district court
has exclusive jurisdiction).
332 See, e.g., Montana Dep't of Rev. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 767. Kurth Ranch held that a tax
on "the possession of illegal drugs," id. at 770, was a fine for double jeopardy purposes, id. at 783-84,
based on several factors: it imposed a "remarkably high tax" rate, id. at 780; the law had "an obvious
deterrent purpose, id.; liability was "conditioned on the commission of a crime," id. at 781; "the taxed
activity is completely forbidden," id. at 782; and despite purporting to be a property tax, it was "levied
on goods that the taxpayer neither owns nor possesses when the tax is imposed." Id. at 783.
333 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 5 ("No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any
State."); see, e.g., United States v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 364 (1998) (holding that Harbor
Maintenance Tax, as assessed against the value of exported cargo, was a tax for purposes of the Export
Clause); United States v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 517 U.S. 843 (1996) (holding that tax on insurance
premiums paid to foreign insurers to insure export shipments violated Export Clause).
334 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. Both the Export Clause and the Import-Export Clause "have
been treated as broad bans on taxation of exports, and in several cases the Court has interpreted the
provisions of the two Clauses in tandem." United States v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 852
(1996). However, the Court has warned "that meaningful textual differences exist and should not be
overlooked." Id. at 857. In Department of Revenue of Washington v. Assoc. of Washington
Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 759 (1978), the Court rejected the claim "that the Import-Export
Clause effects an absolute prohibition on all taxation of imports and exports," saying "the term 'Impost
or Duty' is not self-defining and does not necessarily encompass all taxes."
335 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 ("All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives .... ").
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concerned constitutional provisions constraining government action,
whereas the General Welfare Clause is a grant of power to Congress. Each
requires applying a distinct set of rules based on separate texts and
legislative history, as well as different doctrinal histories than the General
Welfare Clause.336
There is nothing unusual about Congress wielding its fiscal powers to
force people to insure: Medicare and Social Security are in effect
mandatory insurance and pension programs. Much like an insurer's
reserves that are created from the payments of policyholders, these
programs disburse benefits from trust funds paid for by taxes. "A great
deal of federal spending comes from segregated trust funds collected and
spent for a particular purpose. '33 7 Formally speaking, the Medicare, Social
Security and similar benefit programs do not create insurance contracts
binding on the government. That is, Congress could abolish them
tomorrow without having to repay a dime of the tax money it extracted to
fund the program.338 But, given the political invulnerability of these
programs, American taxpayers can reasonably count on medical care later
in life and protection anytime they become disabled. Unquestionably,
these programs are constitutional uses of the General Welfare Clause.339
The only thing uncommon about the ACA mandate is that people are
offered the alternative of purchasing a product from the private market
336 The Export Clause, for example, prohibits "'the imposition of duties on goods by reason or
because of their exportation or intended exportation, or whilst they are being exported,"' but does not
apply if "the goods were not in the course of exportation and might never be exported." Int'l Bus.
Mach. Corp., 517 U.S. at 847 (quoting Turpin v. Burgess, 117 U.S. 504, 507 (1886)). In general, the
clause "prohibits any tax or duty, discriminatory or not, that falls on exports during the course of
exportation." Id. at 848. Based on the clause, the Court has invalidated taxes on bills of lading for
export shipments, Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283 (1901), on ship charters, United States v.
Hvoslef, 237 U.S. 1 (1915), on marine insurance, Thames & Mersey Marine Ins. Co. v. United States,
237 U.S. 19 (1915), and on goods that had been delivered to an export carrier, A.G. Spalding & Bros.
v. Edwards, 262 U.S. 66 (1923). Nonetheless, Pace v. Burgess, 92 U.S. 372, 375 (1876), upheld a per-
package stamp tax on tobacco exports because "[tihe stamp was intended for no other purpose than to
separate and identify the tobacco which the manufacturer desired to export, and thereby, instead of
taxing it, to relieve it from the taxation to which other tobacco was subjected. It was a means devised
to prevent fraud .. " In Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U.S. 418, 427 (1904), the Court held the Export Clause
inapplicable to a federal excise tax on goods manufactured under contract for export, on the ground that
the clause did not constrain "the prior ordinary burdens of taxation which rest upon all property
similarly situated."
337 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 172 (1992) (citing 23 U.S.C. § 118 (Highway Trust
Fund); 42 U.S.C. § 401(a) (Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund); 42 U.S.C. § 401(b)
(Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund); 42 U.S.C. § 1395t (Federal Supplementary Medical
Insurance Trust Fund)).
338 See Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 609-10 (1960) ("The Social Security system may be
accurately described as a form of social insurance, enacted pursuant to Congress' power to 'spend
money in aid of the 'general welfare,"' but it creates no "accrued property rights. ... ) (internal
citations omitted).
339 See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 641 (1937) (sustaining Social Security Old Age Benefits
program under the General Welfare Clause as "conducive to the general welfare").
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rather than paying the tax. Would it be unconstitutional if Congress gave
people an option of contributing to a private pension plan rather than
Social Security? (Presumably the Republican politicians who have
proposed such an initiative do not question its constitutionality.) Of
course, Congress cannot force people to choose between two options when
both are beyond its power to enact. "A choice between two
unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques is no choice at all. 34°
However, Congress can offer a choice of submitting to lawful federal
power or taking some other action that it does not have independent
constitutional authority to impose.34' Even assuming there is no
freestanding authority under the Commerce Clause to force people to buy
private insurance, then, it is constitutional to require people to pay taxes for
the purpose of funding benefits programs. It thus should be constitutional
to offer taxpayers a chance to avoid the ACA assessment by purchasing
insurance.
To be sure, the mandate limits personal freedom in choosing how to
spend one's wealth. But Medicare and Social Security also do so without
running afoul of any constitutional principle. They cause individuals to
spend money that they otherwise would not on what effectively is an
investment. Prior to Medicare, a substantial number of Americans were
financially unable to insure for their medical needs later in life, when
people tend to need the most care. In addition to those who were priced
out of the insurance market, some failed to buy insurance even though they
could have afforded it, Rationally, they should have prepared for the
inevitable. They probably failed to act for the same reasons that people
who can afford health insurance do not obtain coverage. It is a human
tendency to discount future consequences when considering actions that
bring immediate satisfaction. People often prefer spending their money for
immediate benefits rather than choosing to take the "rational" course of
saving a portion of their income and buying insurance. Procrastination
also is a common human tendency, even when we are putting off doing
something that will benefit us in the long run. The Medicare and Social
Security laws make choices for Americans that are contrary to their
"natural" inclinations. These are much greater restrictions on liberty than
the ACA mandate. The payroll taxes for those programs are much more
substantial (and regressive) than the ACA assessment, there is only one
option, and the benefits usually are realized in the distant future.
3 42
341 New York, 505 U.S. at 176.
341 See id. at 172-73 (holding that states can be offered funds derived from taxes on nuclear waste
producers in exchange for meeting a series of regulatory milestones).
342 The Social Security tax is 4.2% of up to $110,100 of a person's earnings (10.4% if self-
employed); Medicare is 1.45% (2.9% if self-employed). SOC. SEC. ADMIN., UNDERSTANDING THE
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Medicare and Social Security also have enormous effects on the
distribution of wealth. In 2010, Medicare spent $516 billion for patient
care. 343 Social Security pays benefits to fifty-five million people who have
retired or become disabled, 344 totaling more than $700 billion annually.345
By government fiat, that money went from the pockets of some to those of
others.
Congress has taxed estates since 1797 by assessing "the transmission
or receipt of property by death," notwithstanding that it usually is
involuntary and much resisted.346 Property can be taxed, regardless of how
passively it is used. Tax laws also can openly aim to redistribute wealth, as
with the progressive income tax. With the mandate, the class of people
bearing the brunt of the assessment as a class is fairly chargeable for the
costs it imposes on society. It is rather like a tax for polluting, which
forces industries to internalize a cost rather than pass it along to the public.
Companies have a tax incentive to reduce their emissions. Yes, they are
harming the public and deserve to be taxed to offset the costs they inflict.
However, there is nevertheless a material similarity between people
without health insurance and polluters. They both impose costs on others
to benefit themselves, and their impact on the public can be counted with a
reasonable degree of accuracy.
Bear in mind that the mandate only affects those who can afford a
policy yet for some reason fail to insure.347 They may be like one of the
plaintiffs in the Sixth Circuit litigation over the ACA, who alleged that if
obliged to buy insurance he would be forced to "cut back on discretionary
spending, such as costs associated with entertainment, like going to the
movies, a restaurant, or sporting events. 348 Nevertheless, as a practical
matter they and every other lawful resident of the country is "insured" to
some extent through public assistance programs or the legal requirement
that they be given emergency care regardless of ability to pay. In effect,
their "premiums" are paid for by other taxpayers, including those who are
insured. The mandate forces people to take responsibility for roughly the
cost they impose on society.
BENEFITS 5 (2012), available at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/l0024.pdf. The penalty under ACA
eventually will be the greater of $695 per person or 2.5% of household income.
343 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., How IS MEDICARE FUNDED? 1 (2011), available
at http://www.medicare.gov/Publications/Pubs/pdf/l 1396.pdf.
344 Soc. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 342, at 4.
... OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACTUARY, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., THE 2011 OASDI TRUSTEES REPORT,
Table II.B (2011), available at http://www.ssa.gov/oact/TR/201 I/11_B_cyoper.html#96807.
346 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41,56-57 (1900).
141 See 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(e)(1) (West 2003 & Supp. 2011) (exempting those who cannot
afford coverage from the mandate).
348 Declaration of Plaintiff-Appellant John Ceci at 7, Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651
F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-2388).
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3. Must Congress Call a Tax a Tax?
The one significant embarrassment to the claim that the ACA mandate
counts as a tax is that Congress called it a "penalty,, 349 a point emphasized
by the Eleventh Circuit and the Act's challengers.350 Further, as the Act's
detractors have stressed, Congress described other revenue-generating
provisions in the law as taxes.3 5' Moreover, although Congress did not
disclaim reliance on its taxing power, it made a number of findings to
justify the Act as a regulation of commerce, and as noted earlier, cited the
South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n for authority.352  President Obama and
other proponents of the Act also declared that the mandate was not a tax.
"For us to say that you've got to take a responsibility to get health
insurance is absolutely not a tax increase," according to the president.
353
This position may have been based on political considerations, namely the
radioactivity of any measure called a tax. Nonetheless, there are other, less
cynical explanations. As the government has argued before the Court,
"[t]he term 'tax' carries with it a number of procedural and substantive
implications under various statutory provisions, and a 'penalty' is not the
same thing as a 'tax' for statutory purposes under the Internal Revenue
Code. 354 Congress also might have avoided the term to indicate that the
Anti-Injunction Act was inapplicable.355 It also may have been concerned
that calling the "shared responsibility payment" a tax would have
undermined basing the mandate on the Commerce Clause.
The fact that Congress did not describe the "shared responsibility
payment" as a "tax" should not make any constitutional difference if it
satisfies the loosely-defined constitutional sense of a tax.356  "[T]hat an
exaction is not labeled a tax does not vitiate Congress's power under the
Taxing Clause., 357 The Court has said that in reviewing the "the constitu-
349 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(b)(1).350 See Brief for Private Respondents, supra note 191, at 64; Jensen, supra note 240, at 49
("Congress called the charge a penalty, and I see no reason to question that characterization. It is a
penalty as we ordinarily understand that term: a punishment for not engaging in desired behavior or for
engaging in disfavored behavior.").
351 See Jensen, supra note 240, at 191.
351 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(2)(A)-(J) (West 2003 & Supp. 2011) (citing United States v. Se.
Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) in which "the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that
insurance is interstate commerce subject to Federal regulation").
313 Robert Pear, Changing Stance, Administration Now Defends Insurance Mandate as a Tax,
N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2010, at A14 (quoting President Obama).
35 Brief for Petitioners (Anti-Injunction Act) at 6, Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs. v. Florida, No.
11-398 (Feb. 2012).
355 See id
36 26 U.S.C. 5000a (C)(1) (2006).
357 Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 48 n.37 (2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (citing License
Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462, 471 (1866)) ("The granting of a license, therefore, must be regarded as nothing
more than a mere form of imposing a tax, and of implying nothing except that the licensee shall be
subject to no penalties under national law, if he pays it.").
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tionality of a state tax 'we are concerned only with its practical operation,
not its definition or the precise form of descriptive words which may be
applied to it.' ' 358 Congress has never been required to use particular magic
words in order to invoke an Article I power. It need not specify the
constitutional basis for legislation,359 or for that matter "articulate its
reasons for enacting a statute., 360 The Court upholds congressional power
on any basis that plausibly could have been cited by Congress as
authorization to legislate. Further, "those attacking the rationality of the
legislative classification have the burden 'to negative every conceivable
basis which might support it." 361 In a variety of constitutional contexts
relating to taxation, the Court has focused on a law's "practical operation,
not its definition or the precise form of descriptive words which may be
applied to it.' '362  A rose is a rose. When the issue is the limits of
congressional power under the General Welfare Clause, the Court after
1937 has refused to inquire into the motives for enacting a measure.
In the instance of the ACA, however, Congress did not merely fail to
label the mandate a tax, it used the term "penalty." Should that make a
difference? There are no cases from the Court precisely addressing
precisely such a law. The closest precedent probably is the License Tax
Cases, in which the Court in 1867 upheld a federal act that licensed those
operating a lottery or selling liquor in violation of state law, turning aside
the argument that Congress was in effect licensing crimes. Not so, Chief
Justice Chase wrote. Notwithstanding that the statute obliged a person to
pay a fee to obtain a license, it was "nothing more than a mere form of
imposing a tax, and of implying nothing except that the licensee shall be
358 City of Detroit v. Murray Corp. of Am., 355 U.S. 489, 492 (1958) (quoting Lawrence v. State
Tax Comm., 286 U.S. 276, 280 (1932)).
359 See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299 (1964) (noting that "no formal findings were
made" regarding the basis of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, "which of course are not necessary"); Heart
of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252 (1964) (upholding the Civil Rights Act of
1964 under the Commerce Clause even though the law "as adopted carried no congressional findings");
Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948) ("The question of the constitutionality of
action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise.").
360 United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
361 FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore
Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)).
362 Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 363 (1941) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted) (upholding a state use tax despite Dormant Commerce Clause objections). In
determining whether an exaction is a "tax" for purposes of determining priorities in bankruptcy, "the
Court [has] looked behind the label placed on the exaction and rested its answer directly on the
operation of the provision using the term in question." United States v. Reorganized CF & I
Fabricators, 518 U.S. 213, 220 (1996). Likewise, "in deciding whether an imposition on exports ranks
as a tax," and thus violates the Export Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5, "'we must regard things
rather than names'...." United States v. U. S. Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 367 (1998) (quoting Pace v.
Burgess, 92 U.S. 372, 376 (1876)).
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subject to no penalties under national law, if he pays it. ' 363 This can be
read to mean that the Court looks to the substance of the law rather than its
labeling. But Congress actually had amended the law in the License Tax
Cases, changing the word "license" to "special tax," which distinguishes it
from the ACA's deliberate use of"penalty.
'30 64
The appropriate question to ask is whether an identical exaction would
pass muster if the T-word were substituted for penalty. Even the ACA's
fiercest critics acknowledge that "except in special circumstances, courts
will not strike down a charge that Congress calls a tax., 365  Should the
mandate be invalidated for using the wrong word? Politicians routinely
wrangle over whether fiscal laws impose taxes, penalties, or fees. (In this
instance, both some members of Congress as well as committee reports
labeled the mandate's exaction a tax.)366 But the meaning they intend from
this rhetorical labeling does not necessarily jibe with constitutional usage.
President Obama, for example, may have meant that the mandate penalty
was not a "tax increase" in the popular sense because it was designed to
make people "take a responsibility., 367  The decisive issue should be
constitutional power to Act, not the precise descriptor used by Congress to
describe the power.
Some commentators have contended that Congress ought to be forced
to call a revenue exaction a "tax" in order for it to qualify as such under
Article I. The main idea behind this argument is that "taxes are much
harder to pass than penalties. 368  This is so because according to "an
emerging body of psychology literature[,] ... voters are significantly more
averse to exactions when they are labeled as 'taxes' [rather] than . . . 'fees'
or 'payments,' even when the exactions are substantively and functionally
identical., 369  Based on this premise, Abigail Moncrieff urges that
363 License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462, 471 (1866).
364 See Act of July 27, 1866, ch. 283, 14 Stat. 301, 302 (substituting "paying the special tax" for
"license"). The Court also said in dictum that "Congress cannot authorize a trade or business within a
State in order to tax it." License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) at 471. That may appear to mean that
Congress can only tax something in existence, but the Court was not making that point. Rather, it was
denying that the tax authorized a person to violate state law.
365 Jensen, supra note 240, at 104-O5.
366 See Brief for the Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Provision) supra note 7, at 58 (detailing
instances in the congressional record when the mandate was referred to as a "tax").
367 See supra note 353 and accompanying text.
368 Abigail R. Moncrieff, Safeguarding the Safeguards: The ACA Litigation and the Extension of
Indirect Protection to Non-Fundamental Liberties, 64 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012); see also
Matthew C. Stephenson, The Prices of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial
Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 YALE L.J. 2, 36-42 (2008) (providing examples of
clear statement rules and interpretive presumptions).
369 Moncrieff, supra note 368 (manuscript at 14). "The public is acutely aware of tax increases,"
Randy Barnett notes. He argues that the mandate's penalty allows Congress and the President to avoid
"the political cost of imposing a general tax on the public using its tax powers." Barnett, supra note 96,
at 632.
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Congress should be required "to label an exaction a 'tax' in order to invoke
its taxing power," because it would "reduce the number of economic
impositions that Congress can enact, and it will force members of Congress
to allocate their political capital carefully, passing only those taxes that are
truly valuable to the legislators. 37° She compares her proposed rule to
requiring clear statements in certain types of statutes, such as those
imposing spending conditions on grants to states, criminal laws, and limits
on speech. There is also a presumption that the historical police powers of
states are not preempted, unless it is the "clear and manifest purpose of
Congress. 371  Randy Barnett makes a related point in arguing that the
mandate is not a proper use of the Commerce Clause, that Americans are
64 ,372acutely aware of tax increases. By imposing the mandate, politicians
"escape accountability for tax increases by compelling citizens to make
payments directly to private companies. 373
It is dubious to rest a constitutional principle on "emerging" findings in
psychology, lest there be a repeat of the Court's reliance in Brown v. Board
of Education on flawed psychological studies purporting to prove the
deleterious effects of racial segregation on blacks.374 Barnett's thesis
implicitly rests on a similar psychological assumption: that the public pays
much more attention to taxes than legislatively-imposed penalties. Both he
and Moncrieff slip a normative bias into their constitutional calculations:
that it is preferable to make it harder to enact taxes. Why? One might
equally say that the well-known American aversion to taxes is unfortunate
because it frustrates achieving goals of greater benefit to the public.
Americans may hate taxes but they do not so much object to government
spending, especially when it benefits them personally, which explains the
perennial federal budget deficits. Rather than adopting a constitutional
rule that restricts Congress in devising the means to pay for results that the
public wants, it is more sensible to apply one that facilitates increasing
revenue to sustain the appetite for public spending. The assumption that
370 Moncrieff, supra note 368.
371 PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2586 (2011) (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S.
555, 565 (2009)).
372 Barnett, supra note 96, at 632.
373 Id.
374 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.l 1, 495 (1954) (citing studies demonstrating
the deleterious effect segregation had on black children); see also Mark G. Yudof, School
Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration, and Social Science Research in the Supreme
Court, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 70 (1978) (noting that it is now widely accepted that the social
evidence the Court relied on in Brown was "methodologically unsound"). Admittedly, however, the
Court occasionally relies on assumed psychological facts. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,
593 (1992) (concluding that a school-sponsored prayer at a high school graduation ceremony violated
the Religion Clauses based on "[r]esearch in psychology . . . [showing] that adolescents are often
susceptible to pressure from their peers towards conformity, and that the influence is strongest in
matters of social convention").
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people are more aware of taxes than penalties also is suspect. Perhaps
Americans do pay more attention to tax laws that affect them than to other
types of legislation. But compared to penalties? Offhand, one might think
that "penalty" is "the name that signals more coercion."3"5
Constitutional law should not indulge in the condescending assumption
that people are ignorant of widely available information or the impact of
legislation on them.376 Presumably the goal of requiring a tax to be called
a tax in its enabling statute is to increase public awareness and discussion
of the measure. If that is so, the mandate should cause no concern. It did
not steal upon Americans under cover of darkness.3 7 Rather, the process
for enacting the law was as transparent as modern legislation gets, with
well-publicized debates and regular public commentary. Any American
paying a modicum of attention to national news knows that the mandate
may have financial consequences for them, the details of which are much
378 tnless complicated than many other sections of the IRS Code. People tend
to forget what tax breaks have been awarded by Congress to special
interests, but they are not likely to neglect noticing that each year they
must report their insurance status to the IRS, and fork over money for
every month they are not in compliance with the mandate. For the same
reason, it is far-fetched to say that people will not hold politicians
accountable if they are obligated to buy a policy from an insurer. When
people are forced by their state to buy auto insurance, do they not
understand that the legislature made them do it? Are they somehow
deceived into thinking that insurance companies can command them to buy
their policies? It is not for nothing that President Obama's opponents have
placed the blame for the ACA directly at his feet, to the point of
introducing a new word into the American lexicon: Obamacare.
Democrats and Republicans in Congress have supported or opposed the
law with partisan discipline, which makes it all the easier for voters to
375 See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 278 (manuscript at 46 n.207) ("Congress tried to diminish
political objections by using the name that signals more coercion ('penalty'), instead of the one that
signals less coercion ('tax').").
376 Analogously, the Court refuses in an equal protection context to inquire into whether
"Congress was unaware of what it accomplished or that it was misled by the groups that appeared
before it. If this test were applied literally to every member of any legislature that ever voted on a law,
there would be very few laws which would survive it." United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S.
166, 179 (1980).
377 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 402 (1819) ("The bill for incorporating
the bank of the United States did not steal upon an unsuspecting legislature, and pass unobserved. Its
principle was completely understood, and was opposed with equal zeal and ability.").
378 Unlike many taxes and associated spending, for the ACA mandate "the process is reasonably
transparent and information with respect to the provision is readily available." Deborah H. Schenk,
Exploiting the Salience Bias in Designing Taxes, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 310 (2011). This is not an
instance in which "taxpayers are unaware of the tax or provision" such that "they cannot respond to it"
through the political process. Id. at 263. Overall, the ACA is very complicated, but it will be simple
for individuals to determine their liability.
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assign responsibility accurately. The upcoming national elections for
Congress and the presidency have already featured vigorous debate over
the wisdom of the enactment.
The various clear statement rules imposed on Congress by the Court
are inapposite as each has a separate justification inapplicable to the ACA
mandate. For example, spending conditions imposed on states must be
clearly stated in the legislation. This is because conditions imposed on
federal grants are part of a "contract": "in return for federal funds, the
States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions. . . . The
legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the spending power thus
rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of
the 'contract.' 379 Requiring conditions to be expressly stated assures there
is "knowing acceptance" of the contractual terms by the participating
states. For a penal statute, due process requires that "[persons] of common
intelligence" not have to guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application. 380 A "vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters
to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective
basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory
application. 3 81 Moreover, when a statute "interferes with the right of free
speech or of association, a more stringent vagueness test should apply" in
order to protect expression from being chilled. 382  "Uncertain meanings
inevitably lead citizens to 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone' . . . than if
the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked., 383 Requiring
specificity of laws affecting speech "assures us that the legislature has
focused on the First Amendment interests and determined that other
governmental policies compel regulation. 384  Obviously none of these
considerations apply to the health insurance mandate. Whatever else might
be said of the directive, no one can call it vague either in purpose or
application.
4. Is the Mandate's Assessment an Unapportioned Capitation or
Direct Tax?
The only remaining question with respect to upholding the mandate's
penalty provision as a revenue measure is whether it constitutes a
379 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (emphasis added).
380 Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
381 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
382 Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-99 (1982)
("The Court has also expressed greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties
because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe. And the Court has recognized
that a scienter requirement may mitigate a law's vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of
notice to the complainant that his conduct is proscribed.").
383 Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109 (citation omitted).
38Id. at 109 n.5.
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capitation tax or a direct tax, which the Constitution requires to be
apportioned by state population.38 5 The mandate's challengers insist that if
the ACA assessment counts as a tax, it must be either a capitation or direct
tax, and hence unconstitutional as its incidence is not apportioned by
population.386
The exaction imposed by the mandate certainly is not a capitation
tax-also known as a head tax or poll tax-which means "[a] fixed tax
levied on each person within a jurisdiction., 387  As the government has
argued in the current litigation, with a quote from Justice Samuel Chase's
concurring opinion in Hylton v. United States, a capitation tax is one levied
"simply, without regard to property, profession, or any other
circumstance."388  That description does not fit the ACA, which bases
liability on the circumstance of not purchasing insurance or being
otherwise exempt. Only a fairly small portion of the population will be
liable. There is little case authority on point, however, as federal capitation
taxes have never been enacted in this country, owing to their being "(1)
unpopular, (2) incapable of producing significant revenue, and (3)
inequitable (as bearing no relation to ability to pay)."'3 89 The mandate does
not suffer from the second or third of these flaws precisely because it will
produce billions of dollars in revenue while not being the same for
390everyone, as it is tied to ability to pay.
385 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 ("[D]irect Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States
which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers ...."); id. art. I, § 9,
cl. 4 ("No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or
Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.").
386 See Brief for Private Respondents, supra note 191, at 66.
387 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (entry for "poll tax"). Samuel Johnson defined a
capitation as a "[n]umeration by heads." I JOHNSON, supra note 216 (entry for "capitation"); see also
Jack M. Balkin, The Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate for Health Insurance, 362 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 482, 482 (2010) (contending that capitations extract taxes people "no matter what they do");
Joseph M. Dodge, What Federal Taxes are Subject to the Rule of Apportionment Under the
Constitution?, II U. PA. J. CONST. L. 839, 843 (2009) (arguing that apportionment requirement "is
confined to federal taxes on real estate and tangible personal property."); Edward D. Kleinbard,
Constitutional Kreplach, 128 TAx NOTES 755, 762 (2010).
388 Brief for Private Respondents on the Individual Mandate at 25, U.S. Dep't Health & Human
Servs. v. Florida, No. 11-398 (Jan. 11, 2012) (quoting Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171,
175 (1796) (opinion of Chase, J.)).
389 Dodge, supra note 387, at 841.
390 But see Jensen, supra note 240, at 113-17 (arguing that a capitation tax need not be generally
applicable). Jensen does not have any case authority for his claim, but instead relies on Adam Smith's
description of a capitation tax in England that varied by the person's rank, or in the case of shopkeepers
and tradesmen, the volume of their business. It may be that "some of the Founders were familiar with
Smith's writings." Id. at 115. However, this hardly counts as strong historical evidence of their
accepting any of Smith's conclusions. Jensen also asks why, if by definition a capitation tax must be
the same for everyone, "did the Founders bother to require apportionment based on population for a tax
that by its nature seems automatically to be apportioned?" Id. at 113. But the Constitution provides
that "[n]o Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or
Enumeration herein before directed to be taken." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. This makes it plain that
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A direct tax has been said by the Court to be "one imposed upon
property as such, rather than on the performance of an act."'3 9' At the
Virginia ratifying convention, John Marshall asserted it was "well
understood" that the "objects of direct taxes" were "few," listing them as
"[l]ands, slaves, stock of all kind, and a few other articles of domestic
property. 3 92 Aside from capitation taxes, all others were indirect, subject
to the limitation that those qualifying as "Duties, Imposts and Excises shall
be uniform throughout the United States. 39 3 In addition to property and
poll taxes, these three covered the gamut of possible taxes known in the
late eighteenth century. Samuel Johnson's 1785 dictionary defined
capitation taxes must be based on the census, which rather suggests uniformity. By contrast, an earlier
provision requires that "direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be
included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
Presumably the Framers did not include capitation taxes in this clause for the reason Jensen gives: it
was unnecessary because by their nature capitation taxes had to be apportioned by population.
391 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 318 (2d ed. 1988); see also
Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 352 (1945) ("Congress may tax real estate or chattels if the tax is
apportioned, and without apportionment it may tax an excise upon a particular use or enjoyment of
property or the shifting from one to another of any power or privilege incidental to the ownership or
enjoyment of property."); Murphy v. IRS, 493 F.3d 170, 181 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ("Only three taxes are
definitely known to be direct: (1) a capitation, . . . (2) a tax upon real property, and (3) a tax upon
personal property."); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 387, at 1595 (defining "direct tax" as one
"imposed on property, as distinguished from a tax on a right or privilege").
392 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (VIRGINIA)
1122 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1990) (statement of delegate John Marshall, June 10, 1788).
393 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. In Pollock v. Farmers'Loan and Trust Co., the Court opined that
there were likely only two categories of federal taxes: direct taxes and "Duties, Imposts and Excises."
157 U.S. 429, 557 (1895); see also id, (noting that although there had been occasional "intimations that
there might be some tax which was not a direct tax, nor included under the words 'duties, imports, and
excises,' such a tax, for more than 100 years of national existence, has as yet remained undiscovered,
notwithstanding the stress of particular circumstances has invited thorough investigation into sources of
revenue."). The constitutional text does not support this interpretation. It says that a direct tax must be
apportioned by population, which implicitly recognizes a category of "indirect taxes," but the text does
not limit those to "Duties, Imposts and Excises." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. Rather, it specifies that
that these three types must use the same tax rates in all parts of the country. Perhaps the Court meant
that, as a practical matter, the three named taxes "embrace[d] all forms of taxation contemplated by the
Constitution." Thomas v. United States, 192 U.S. 363, 370 (1904). That is, both the framers of the
Constitution and the justices were unaware of any other types of indirect taxes than these three, which
is plausible given its expansive definition of them in the same case. The early Court recognized that
there could be other types of taxes than those three that did not require apportionment. See Hylton v.
United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 174 (opinion of Chase, J.) (finding that General Welfare Clause grants
"power,... to lay and collect taxes, include[ing] a power to lay direct taxes, (whether capitation, or any
other) and also duties, imposts, and excises; and every other species or kind of tax whatsoever, and
called by any other name."); id. at 177 (opinion of Paterson, J.) (asserting that there were "other classes
of an indirect kind" aside from duties, imposts, and excises, and concluding that it was "a questionable
point" "[w]hether direct taxes, in the sense of the Constitution, comprehend any other tax than a
capitation tax, and tax on land .. "); id. at 181 (opinion of Iredell, J.) (stating that ifa tax is "neither
direct within the meaning of the Constitution, nor comprehended within the term duty, impost or
excise[,] there is no provision in the Constitution, one way or another.").
2012]
CONNECTICUTLA W REVIEW
"impost" as "a tax; a toll; a custom paid., 394 He gave a similar reading of a
"duty," as a "tax; impost; custom; toll. '395 His definition of an "excise"
was politically slanted: "[a] hateful tax levied upon commodities.... ,,396
Gouvemeur Morris, who introduced the clause at the Constitutional
Convention (and later disavowed it), referred to indirect taxes as those "on
exports & imports & on consumption., 397 Hamilton wrote in Federalist
No. 36 that indirect taxes were "duties and excises on articles of
consumption., 398 A few years later, when defending the constitutionality
of a federal tax on carriages before the Court against the charge that it was
an unapportioned direct tax, Hamilton said that the only direct taxes were
"Capitation or Poll Taxes," "Taxes on Lands and Buildings," and "General
assessments whether on the whole property of individuals or on their
whole real or personal estate.,, 399 Every other revenue measure "must of
necessity be considered as indirect taxes," including the carriage tax, which
had been enacted while Hamilton was Secretary of the Treasury to pay for
expanding the military.4 °°
Justice Iredell likewise thought that there was "no necessity, or
propriety in determining what is or is not a direct or indirect tax in all
cases. . . . It is sufficient, on the present occasion, for the court to be
satisfied that this is not a direct tax contemplated by the
Constitution... ."401 Justice Chase wrote in Hylton that there were "only
two" types of direct tax, "a capitation, or poll tax, simply, without regard to
property, profession, or any other circumstance; and a tax on LAND.
40 2
He then turned the approach to direct taxes into a tautology-a tax was
direct only if it could be apportioned by population: "The Constitution
evidently contemplated no taxes as direct taxes, but only such as
Congress could lay in proportion to the census. The rule of
apportionment is only to be adopted in such cases where it can
reasonably apply....
394 1 JOHNSON, supra note 216 (entry for "impost").
395 Id. (entry for "duty").
396 Id. (entry for "excise"). His definition also states than excises were "adjudged not by the
common judges of property, but wretches hired by those to whom excise is paid." Id
397 Gouverneur Morris, Constitutional Convention (July 12, 1787), reprinted in I RECORDS OF
THE FED. CONV. 591-92 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
398 THE FEDERALIST No. 36, at 225 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961).
399 4 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 354 (Julius Goebel
& Henry Smith eds., 1980) (summarizing Hamilton's argument for the government in Hylton v. United
States, 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 171 (1796)).
400 id.
40' Id. at 183 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
402 Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at 175 (opinion of Chase, J.).
43 Id at 174; see also id. at 183 (Iredell, J., concurring) (asserting that a direct tax must be
"capable of apportionment."); Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 687 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("I regard it as very
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In 1881, the Court embraced Hamilton's view that there were two
types of direct tax, by capitation or on ownership of real and personal
property.4°4 After reviewing several early taxes, Justice Swayne wrote that
"whenever the government has imposed a tax which it recognized as a
direct tax, it has never been applied to any objects but real estate and
slaves."405
By contrast, with one notable exception, the Court's cases have
construed the term "indirect tax" expansively, as "[a] tax laid upon the
happening of an event" such as the conveyance of property at death, rather
than the tangible fruits" of property ownership.4 °6  In Bromley v.
McCaughn, Justice Stone wrote for the Court in 1929 that whereas "taxes
levied upon or collected from persons because of their general ownership
of property may be taken to be direct,.. . a tax imposed upon a particular
use of property or the exercise of a single power over property incidental to
ownership, is an excise which need not be apportioned." 40 7  An earlier
decision explained that "the words duties, imposts, and excises" were
meant to be "used comprehensively to cover customs and excise duties
imposed on importation, consumption, manufacture, and sale of certain
commodities, privileges, particular business transactions, vocations,
occupations, and the like. 4 °8  Excise, in particular, included those
"imposed on the manufacture, sale, or use of goods (such as a cigarette
tax), or on an occupation or activity (such as a license tax) ....
The ACA exaction does not meet the longstanding definition of a
direct tax, so by default it must be indirect. Liability under the mandate is
not based merely on owning or possessing property ("upon property as
such"), but on the circumstance of being uninsured, calculated according to
the number of months without coverage and adjusted by income. Those
who forgo insuring when they can afford to do so are not merely failing to
clear that the clause requiring direct taxes to be apportioned to the population has no application to
taxes which are not capable of apportionment according to population.").
404 Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 597-98 (1880).
40' Id. at 599.
406 See Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497, 502 (1930) (holding that inheritance taxes are
indirect); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 83 (1900) (holding that inheritance taxes are indirect).
40' 280 U.S. 124, 136 (1929) (holding that gift tax is indirect).
408 Thomas v. United States, 192 U.S. 363, 370 (1904).
409 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 387 (entry for "excise"). "An 'excise' duty is an
inland impost, levied upon articles of manufacture or sale, and also upon licenses to pursue certain
trades or to deal in certain commodities."' THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
TAXATION 3 (2d. ed. 1886); see also Pollock II, 157 U.S at 622 (White, J., dissenting) ("Direct taxes,
when laid by Congress, must be apportioned among the several States according to the representative
population. The term 'direct taxes' as employed in the Constitution has a technical meaning, and
embraces capitation and land taxes only.") (quoting COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TAXATION 3
(2d ed. 1886)); Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 352 (1945) (defining "excise" as a levy "upon a
particular use or enjoyment of property or the shifting from one to another of any power or privilege
incidental to the ownership or enjoyment of property").
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act. Rather, they are self-insuring, however inadequately. There is a real
cost to self-insurance, both to the individual who must pay medical bills
out of personal reserves and the rest of society that picks up the tab after
financial resources are exhausted. That sounds more like an excise for the
privilege of doing something: "purchasing" self-insurance and consuming
health care services with cash or charity. It is a "tax on expence," not on
wealth per se.41°
The penalty also has an affinity with income taxes. In effect,
uninsured persons have been enjoying unreported income equivalent to the
economic value of the "insurance" that guarantees they will receive at least
basic care without paying The amount of the "shared responsibility"
assessment is related both to the value of those imputed earnings and the
taxpayer's income. The obligation is capped at either a percentage of
income or the cost of a basic plan, and it must be reported on the person's
annual income tax return. In that sense, the penalties literally are "taxes on
incomes," arguably permitted by the Sixteenth Amendment.41
Technically, the amendment may not sanction the mandate, because the
triggering event for liability is the failure to insure rather than income per
se. But, as previously argued, Congress unquestionably could have
achieved an identical outcome through a combination of the income tax
and a tax credit for insuring. 2 That counsels against concluding that the
mandate offends whatever constitutional policy lies behind the
apportionment requirement.
The private plaintiffs in the Florida litigation and several
commentators disagree, arguing that the mandate's tax is "levied on the
absence of any transaction, shift in property rights, or particular use of
property."4 3  To them, this seems to be a tax on nothing, a simple
redistribution of wealth from younger, healthier people who would
otherwise not buy insurance to an older population of less healthy
individuals. Older Americans get the benefit of eliminating pre-existing
conditions while having their premiums kept from rising astronomically by
increasing the pool of healthy people paying premiums. On this view,
Congress is nakedly "'tak[ing] property from A. and giv[ing] it to B,' thus
usurping the power of individuals to preserve their property and to choose
with whom they financially associate.
414
According to the state plaintiffs, the mandate does not impose an
410 Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 175 (opinion of Chase, J.).
11 U.S. CONST. amd. XVI.
412 See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
413 Brief for Private Respondents, supra note 191, at 66; see also Willis & Chung, supra note 244,
at 727 (arguing that a tax cannot be based on doing "nothing").
414 Brief for Private Respondents, supra note 191, at 13 (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388
(1798)).
[Vol. 44:1133
ON SLIPPERY CONSTITUTIONAL SLOPES
excise, which is triggered by some action of a person (including dying), but
rather "a direct tax on an individual's wealth, simply because the
individual chooses to keep that wealth rather than spend it to purchase
insurance."'415 The private plaintiffs rely heavily on the one case in which
the Court has found an assessment to be an unapportioned direct tax-the
harshly-criticized 5-4 ruling in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.,
4 1 6
which invalidated a "tax on income derived from real estate, and from
invested personal property, ' ' 4 17 as well as a "a tax upon a person's entire
income-whether derived from rents or products, or otherwise, of real
15418
estate, or from bonds, stocks, or other forms of personal property ....
This result was surprising given that in Springer v. United States the Court
in 1880 had upheld a Civil War tax on personal "income, gains, and
profits.'A 19 In Pollock, the majority distinguished Springer as upholding a
tax on earned income, not the profits of real property, a mighty fine
distinction.420
"Pollock caused a public furor," Bruce Ackerman has written, noting
William Howard Taft's assessment that "[n]othing has ever injured the
prestige of the Supreme Court more.,A21 The Court quickly retreated from
its implications, and never again struck down a tax on the ground that it
was direct and unapportioned. Even before the adoption of the Sixteenth
Amendment in 1913 repudiating Pollock, other decisions sharply limited
its scope. 422  The post-Pollock Court upheld a federal inheritance tax, a
corporate income tax, and a tax on income from specific types of business.
415 Brief for State Respondents on the Minimum Coverage Provision at 62, U.S. Dep't Health &
Human Servs. v. Florida, No. 11-398 (Feb. 6, 2012).
416 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895) [Pollock II]; Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895) [Pollock 1]. The criticism started with Justice Harlan's
blistering dissent: "I cannot assent to an interpretation of the constitution that impairs and cripples the
just powers of the national government in the essential matter of taxation, and at the same time
discriminates against the greater part of the people of our country." Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 685
(Harlan, J., dissenting). Among the many academic critics of Pollock, see e.g., Bruce Ackerman,
Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 28, 58 (1999). (Pollock "was utterly
wrongheaded"); Calvin H. Johnson, Fixing the Constitutional Absurdity of the Apportionment of Direct
Tax, 21 Const. Commentary 295, 298 (2004) ("Pollock is a model of bad judicial behavior.").
417 Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 635. The Court reasoned that because "taxes on real estate [were]
indisputably direct taxes, taxes on the rents or income of real estate are equally direct taxes." Id. at
637. See Pollock I, 157 U.S. at 581 ("An annual tax upon the annual value or annual user of real estate
appears to us the same in substance as an annual tax on the real estate, which would be paid out of the
rent or income.").
418 See Pollock I, 158 U.S. at 635 (invalidating a "tax on income derived from real estate, and
from invested personal property").
419 102 U.S. 586, 597-98 (1880); see also Dodge, supra note 387, at 880.
420 See Pollock I, 157 U.S. at 578-79; Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 656-57.
421 Ackerman, supra note 416, at 5 (quoting 1 ARCHIBALD BuTT, TAFT AND ROOSEVELT 134
(1930)).
422 U.S. CONST. amd. XVI ("The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes,
from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to
any census or enumeration.").
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In finding these taxes to be indirect, the Court effectively limited Pollock
to its facts: only taxes on income from property or investments were
direct.423 In Pollock itself, Chief Justice Fuller stressed that the Court had
not "commented on gains or profits from business, privileges, or
employments, in view of the instances in which taxation on business,
privileges, or employments has assumed the guise of an excise tax and
been sustained as such.A
24
The private plaintiffs in the Florida litigation nevertheless regard
Pollock as "governing precedent on the scope of direct taxes, despite the
mooting of its specific holding" by the amendment.425 (In contrast, the
state plaintiffs do not cite Pollock.) The private plaintiffs read Pollock to
mean "that taxes on income from real or personal property are direct, as de
facto taxes on the owner's retention of that property. ''426 However, Pollock
does not give precisely this rationale for treating income from property as
direct. Rather, the Court reasoned formalistically, declaring that taxes on
"income derived from real estate, and from invested personal property"
427
were direct inasmuch they were assessed "merely because of ownership"




The Court soon repudiated the significance of a tax being unavoidable
to the question of whether it was direct. A few years after Pollock, it
rejected the claim that a tax on sales at commodities exchanges was "direct
because it cannot be added to the price of the thing sold, and therefore
ultimately paid by the consumer. 4 29 The tax still could be "a duty or an
excise,A30 as the Court classified the exchange tax.431 By 1900, the Court
had all but dismissed the relevance of cost-shifting, calling it a "disputable
theory" proposed by "certain economists" that "was not the basis of the
conclusion of the court" in Pollock.4 32 That position has been reiterated in
a "long line of cases. ' 'A33 A few academic commentators have promoted
423 See TRIBE, supra note 391, at 575; see also e.g., Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 150,
162 (1911) (upholding corporate income tax); Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397
(1904) (holding that a "special excise tax" on sugar refiners under the War Revenue Act of 1898 was
indirect, even though it was based on a percentage of a refiner's gross annual receipts above a certain
amount); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900) (ruling that an inheritance tax was indirect).
424 Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 635.
425 Brief for Private Respondents (Individual Mandate), United States Dep't Health & Human
Servs. v. Florida, No. 11-398, at 66 n.2 (Jan. 11, 2012). ("Pollock remains governing precedent on the
scope of direct taxes, despite the mooting of its specific holding [by] the Sixteenth Amendment . .
426 Id. at 66.
427 Pollock 1I, 158 U.S. at 635.
428 Id. at 627.
429 Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 520 (1899).
410 Id.; see also Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 82 (1900) (holding that the ability to shift costs
onto others is not the test for whether a tax is direct).
411 Nicol, 173 U. S. at 520.
432 Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 82.
433 Murphy v. IRS, 493 F.3d 170, 184 (D.C. App. 2007).
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cost-shifting as the key consideration in determining whether a tax is
direct,434 but they have not persuaded either courts or scholars. The
criterion does not have a clear basis in constitutional text or the
documentary history of the Constitution's ratification, and it would
produce arbitrary results if adopted.435
Businesses cannot avoid income taxes-which the Court held
indirect--except by closing their doors. They may blunt the impact by
shifting some of the burden onto customers in the form of higher prices.
But not always or in full. All indirect taxes are unavoidable, save by not
engaging in the taxed activity. A sales tax, for example, can only be
dodged by not buying, which is tough to avoid doing. Death taxes are
considered indirect even though they are inevitable and cannot be shifted
by the estate.436 Sometimes indirect taxes can be shifted to others,
sometimes not. A business may be able to pass a sales tax onto customers,
but then those consumers are stuck with paying; they then can be hit with
an indirect use tax (like the carriage tax) for possessing what they bought.
On the other hand, property taxes sometimes can be shifted. A property
owner may be able to pass property taxes onto tenants by raising rent, but
they are still regarded as direct. The reason that property taxes are
considered direct is not that they are unshiftable, but because they were
regarded as direct by the framing generation.
Assuming that Pollock has some viability for deciding whether a tax is
direct, the ACA mandate still should be unaffected. The tax in Pollock
was said to be direct because it had been "laid upon a person's 'general
ownership of property,' ' '437 whereas the mandate is a tax based on insur-
ance status. It is only a tax on property in the trivial sense that it must be
paid for with money, a feature of all modem taxes. There is no
relationship between the ACA assessment and the value of a person's
property, although liability for the tax is linked to a person's income. It
can either be characterized as an excise on self-insurance or a tax on
imputed income.
Pollock, however, does not merit much respect. In considering its
continued relevance, the Court should treat the Sixteenth Amendment like
434 Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, the Sixteenth Amendment, and the Meaning of "Incomes,"
33 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1057, 1091-1107 (2001) (contending that a tax on individual consumption would be
direct); Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of "Direct Taxes": Are Consumption Taxes
Constitutional?, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2334 (1997) (same).
431 See Dodge, supra note 387, at 862 (footnotes omitted) ("On the merits, the 'non-shifted'
meaning of 'direct tax' sinks into quicksand, because even 'add-on' taxes might not be shifted but
rather absorbed by the seller, and, at the other end of the spectrum, taxes 'directly' on persons,
property, or income might be shifted if it is (realistically) assumed that markets are imperfect.").
436 The beneficiaries might be said ultimately to bear the cost of the tax, but the decadent still is
unavoidably deprived of wealth.
411 Murphy, 493 F.3d at 181 (quoting Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 136 (1929)).
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it does other amendments that were intended to overrule specific cases.
The Eleventh Amendment overruled Chisholm v. Georgia after a public
438outcry. In a long line of cases, the Court has interpreted the Eleventh
Amendment as extending beyond its literal language, which only bars suits
in federal courts against states brought by citizens of other states or foreign
countries, not cases involving a state and its own citizens.439 More
broadly, it was intended "to restore the original constitutional design" of
protecting the states against all suits.440 The Court applies what it regards
as the larger purpose of the Eleventh Amendment, "to prevent the indignity
of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the
instance of private parties." 44' Similarly, the anti-commandeering principle
that the Court has developed to restrain Congress in its regulation of the
states, "is not derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself,
which,. . . is essentially a tautology. Instead, the Tenth Amendment
confirms that the power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that
may, in a given instance, reserve power to the States.
'442
The Sixteenth Amendment should likewise be interpreted as not
merely overruling Pollock, allowing income taxes even though they are
direct, but instead restoring the original understanding of direct taxes as
limited to those on the value of property itself or based on capitation. The
Court, however, has not embraced this view of the amendment. Rather, it
decided nearly a hundred years ago that the amendment "provides for a
hitherto unknown power of taxation; that is, a power to levy an income. tax
which, although direct, should not be subject to the regulation of
apportionment applicable to all other direct taxes. ' 443 This conclusion was
dictum that does not deserve continuing recognition by the Court. It also
should enforce the principle that if there is uncertainty about whether a
revenue-raising measure is a direct or indirect tax, the presumption ought
to favor Congress. Justice Chase wrote in Hylton that "if the case was
doubtful," deference must be given to a "deliberate decision of the National
438 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
431 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
440 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 722 (1999).
441 Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)
(internal quotation marks removed) (quoting In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887)); see also Ex Parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 188-89 (1908) ("To secure the manifest purposes of the constitutional exemption
guaranteed by the 11 th Amendment requires that it should be interpreted, not literally and too narrowly,
but fairly, and with such breadth and largeness as effectually to accomplish the substance of its
purpose.").
442 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992).
443 Brushaber v. Union Pac. R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 11 (1916); see also Hale v. Iowa State Bd.
Assessment & Review, 302 U.S. 95, 107 (1937) ("By the teaching of the Pollock Case an income tax
on the rents of land... or even on the fruits of other investments ... is an impost upon property within
the section of the Constitution... governing the apportionment of direct taxes among the states.").
[Vol. 44:1133
ON SLIPPERY CONSTITUTIONAL SLOPES
Legislature" in deciding that a tax was not direct.4" Subsequent opinions
have deferred to Congress on the question of whether a tax is direct, and as
we have seen, the Court has found a wide variety of revenue measures to
be indirect.445
There are several reasons why the Sixteenth Amendment should be
interpreted broadly, combined with a deferential approach to congressional
judgment on whether a tax is direct tax. To begin with, the requirement
that direct taxes be apportioned by population has an unsavory origin. It
was "part and parcel of a larger compromise over slavery at the
Philadelphia Convention," 446 introduced during the debates leading to the
Great Compromise. A slave state "would get three-fifths of its slaves
counted for purposes of representation in the House and the Electoral
College." 4 7 At the same time, in calculating any "tax reasonably linked to
overall population," the tally must include slaves (discounted to three-fifths
of a person)." 8  Linking taxes to population was proposed initially by
Gouverneur Morris, and it was quickly approved with a friendly
amendment from James Wilson limiting "the rule to direct taxation."
449
This occurred while the Convention was still debating whether to include
slaves in determining a state's representation in Congress, and if so,
whether they would be counted equally with whites. Morris and Wilson
were hardly friendly to slavery, and they both spoke strongly against
counting slaves for purposes of representation. Wilson said doing so
would "give disgust to the people of Pena.," ' 0 and fellow Pennsylvanian
Morris insisted that its "people ... will never agree to a representation of
Negroes. 45 1  He also predicted that including slaves in the tally would
"give ... encouragement to the slave trade.' 452 Agreeing to count slaves at
all for representation purposes was seen by them and others from the North
as a major concession, which the South must recompense. Their proposal
to apportion direct taxes to population evidently was intended to make the
South pay if slaves were counted in representation. Wilson commented
during the debate on "that less umbrage would perhaps be taken agst. an
"4 Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 173 (1796) (opinion of Chase, J.).
445 See supra notes 393, 406-07 & 423.
446 Ackerman, supra note 416, at 4.
447Id.; see also I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 597 (Max Farrand ed.,
1937) (adopting motion for "proportioning representation to direct taxation & both to the white & 3/5
of black inhabitants").
448 Ackerman, supra note 416, at 4; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (apportioning representation
and direct taxes by state population); id. § 9 (requiring that capitation and direct taxes be apportioned
according to the census).
449 Gouvemeur Morris, I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 447, at 592 (July
12, 1787); see id. at 592 (Wilson's amendment); id at 592-93 (approving motion unanimously).
411 Id. at 587 (July 11, 1787).
411Id. at 593 (July 12, 1787).452 Id. at 588 (July 11, 1787).
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admission of the slaves into the Rule of representation, if ... they should
enter into the rule of taxation).'453 Nonetheless, several leading southern
delegates (who happened to be major slave owners) immediately agreed
with "the justice of the principle. '454 Charles Cotesworth Pinckney thought
that "it is so just that it could not be objected to. ' '45 5 And no one did. Later
the same day, the Convention agreed to Edmund Randolph's motion for
"rating the blacks at 3/5 of their number" in the next census, with another
amendment by Wilson, "that the representation ought to be proportioned
according to direct taxation. ' '456  A few days later, the Convention
approved the Great Compromise providing for equal representation of
states in the Senate and apportioning the House and direct taxes according
to population, counting slaves as three-fifths of a person.457
Gouverneur Morris soon regretted what he had done. Less than two
weeks after proposing the apportionment rule, and after the Great
Compromise was adopted, he unsuccessfully urged delegates to "strike out
the whole of the clause proportioning direct taxation to representation. He
had only meant it as "a bridge to assist us over a certain gulph," the issue
of representation for slaves, and "having passed the gulph the bridge may
be removed., 458 Now he "thought the principle laid down with so much
strictness, liable to strong objections.4 59 Morris had been too clever for
his own good. Apparently, he had proposed linking taxation with
representation as a parliamentary maneuver to chill the South's insistence
on counting slaves for representation. Southerners quickly realized that
they had gotten the better of the deal and they were not about to revisit the
issue. The South was guaranteed to benefit politically from counting
slaves for purposes of representation in the House and in the Electoral
College. At the same time, poll taxes and direct taxes were unlikely to be
enacted, as Morris and others realized. "It is idle to suppose that the Genl.
Govt. can stretch its hand directly into the pockets of the people scattered
over so vast a Country. They can only do it through indirect taxes on
453 James Wilson, 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 447, at 595 (July 11,
1787).
454 George Mason, 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 447, at 592; see also
Pierce Butler, 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 447, at 592 (insisting that
representation should "be according to the full number of inhabits. Including all the blacks ... ").
451 Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 447, at
592. 456 James Wilson, 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 447, at 595.
457 See James Wilson, 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 447, at 15 (July 16,
1787) (approving Great Compromise).
458 Gouverneur Morris, 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 447, at 106 (July
24, 1787). Morris had meant "to lessen the eagerness on one side, & the opposition of the other, to the
Share of Representation by the S. States on account if the Negroes." Id., n.*.
459 id.
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"exports imports & excises, ' ' 60 which he realized would "fall heavier on"
Northerners "than on the Southern inhabitants. ' 461 If a national capitation
or property tax were enacted, the South was protected against
discriminatory treatment. Justice William Paterson, who had been a New
Jersey delegate at the Convention, wrote in Hylton v. United States that the
direct tax provision "was made in favor of the southern States."'462 Without
it, the South "would have been wholly at the mercy of the other states.
Congress in such case, might tax slaves, at discretion or arbitrarily.. .. ,,461
The compromise over apportioning direct taxes was unraveled by the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Fourteenth Amendment,
provided that "Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number
of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed."464 Bruce Ackerman
has argued that after "the Reconstructionist Amendments, there is no
longer a constitutional point in enforcing a lapsed bargain with the slave
power. ' 465 That has not been the attitude of the Court, which has taken the
direct tax provision seriously, nor does the text demand Ackerman's
interpretation. Neither amendment explicitly refers to allotting direct taxes
by population, presumably because in abolishing slavery the Thirteenth
Amendment made everyone "free," and hence the three-fifths rule was
moot even if not abolished, remaining in the Constitution as a vestigial
reminder of its nefarious purpose. 66
460 Gouverneur Morris, 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 447, at 223 (Aug.
8, 1787). Elbridge Gerry realized that a direct tax could "not be carried into execution as the States
were not to be taxed as States," id. at (July 12, 1787). Oliver Ellsworth observed that a poll tax could
be apportioned with "no difficulty," but "probably" would not be enacted. 1 RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 447, at 597
461 Gouvemeur Morris, 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 447, at 222 (Aug.
8, 1787).
462 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 177 (1796).
463 Id. A few days before the Convention ended, George Read of Delaware successfully moved to
amend Article I, § 9, "to insert after 'capitation' the words, 'or other direct tax."' Read had a different
agenda than Morris; he "was afraid that some liberty might otherwise be taken to saddle the States,
with a readjustment by this rule, of past requisitions of Congs-and that his amendment ... would
take away the pretext." 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 447, at 618
(Sept. 14, 1787). There was no recorded debate on the amendment, which passed unanimously. The
Articles of Confederation provided that requisitions from the states "for the common defence or general
welfare" must be apportioned according to "the value of all land within each state," including
"buildings and improvements." ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. 8. Since Article I, § 2, cl.
2, already provided that direct taxes must be apportioned by population, Read's interest must have been
in assuring that direct taxes could not be laid until the first census was laid, which would make "it
impossible for Congress to force Delaware to pay off its old requisitions without regard to its share of
the total population." Ackerman, supra note 416, at 13. "Delaware in substantial default on its prior
requisitions ... I" d. at 14.
464 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
465 Ackerman, supra note 416, at 58 (1999).
466 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
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The repellent origins of the direct tax provision and the repudiation of
its purpose by amendment should not to be ignored when applying it today.
It was based on a principle that was repudiated by the Reconstruction
amendments. At the most, the apportionment requirement for direct taxes
should be interpreted as proscribing taxes that overtly discriminate against
certain states without regard to the basis for taxation,467 a most unlikely
occurrence. Putting aside the odious setting for the rule, the legitimate
purpose of the Direct Tax Clause was to prevent Congress from overtly
taxing some states more heavily than others. The Court said in 1900 "that
the requirement that direct taxes should be apportioned among the several
states, contemplated the protection of the states, to prevent their being
called upon to contribute more than was deemed their due share of the
burden, is clear.''468 That aligns it with the requirement that "all Duties,
Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States,"
meaning that the same tax rate must apply wherever the taxable event
occurs.
46 9 And it comports with the Port Preference Clause, which forbids
Congress from giving preference in "any Regulation of Commerce or
Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another.
4 70
Whatever else might be said about the ACA mandate, it does not
discriminate on its face by state or region. The rate is the same for
everyone who pays the assessment. To be sure, more revenue will be
extracted per capita from the residents of some states than others, but not
for a discriminatory reason. It is no more offensive in this regard than
other federal taxes that collect disproportionate amounts from different
states.
Another reason that counsels against applying the direct tax clause
aggressively is uncertainty over what it meant to the founding generation.
Although the general purpose of the apportionment requirement is known
from the records of the Convention, the same cannot be said for the exact
meaning of "direct tax." Rufus King asked the delegates, "what was the
precise meaning of direct taxation? ' '471 Madison recorded that no one
answered the question. The discussion of the subject inside and outside of
467 The Court eventually recognized that taxes could be considered uniform for constitutional
purposes even if they applied to only a few states defined geographic area. See United States v.
Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74 (1983).
468 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. at 89.
469 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see also Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 583 (1937)
("According to the settled doctrine, the uniformity exacted is geographical, not intrinsic."); Edye v.
Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 594 (1884) ("The tax is uniform when it operates with the same force and
effect in every place where the subject of it is found."); United States v. Singer, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 111,
121 (1872) ("The tax here is uniform in its operation; that is, it is assessed equally upon all
manufacturers of spirits wherever they are. The law does not establish one rule for one distiller and a
different rule for another, but the same rule for all alike.").
170 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6.
471 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 447, at 350.
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the Convention was sparse. At most, there was consensus that direct taxes
included land taxes, although as noted some thought that personal property
taxes were direct. In the debates on the federal carriage tax in 1794 that
was at issue in Hylton v. United States, Rep. Fisher Ames found it
"difficult to define whether a tax is direct or not. ' 472 Many years later, the
Court said the same. "It does not appear that an attempt was made by any
one to define the exact meaning of the language employed," lamented
Justice Swayne in 1880.473  Justice Harlan wrote in in 1904 that the
distinction between "taxes that are direct and those which are to be
regarded simply as excises" is "often very difficult to be expressed in
words. ' 74  On such occasions, it is to best to follow Wittgenstein's
admonition: "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in
silence. '
75
The Court also should be chary of finding a tax to be direct because
doing so would deprive Congress of an option in garnering revenues, and
possibly derail innovative programs. Any direct tax would have to be
apportioned by population, which would be politically difficult to
accomplish. 76 Finding a type of tax to be direct thus would effectively
preclude its use by Congress. This result is contrary to the Court's
longstanding emphasis on the breadth of the taxing power, that it is
"complete and all-embracing. ' 477 For more than a century, it has stressed
the importance of practicality in deciding the constitutionality of federal
taxes:
Taxation is eminently practical, and is, in fact, brought to
every man's door, and for the purpose of deciding upon its
validity a tax should be regarded in its actual, practical
results, rather than with reference to those theoretical or
abstract ideas whose correctness is the subject of dispute
and contradiction among those who are experts in the
science of political economy.478
472 1 Annals Cong. 730 (May 29, 1794) (noting that Ames thought the carriage tax was indirect,
an excise).
473 Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 596 (1880).
474 Spreckels Sugar Ref. Co. v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397, 413 (1904).
475 Ludwig Wittgenstein, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS 151 (D.F. Pears & B.F.
McGuinness trans., 1961).
476 See Jensen, supra note 240, at 110 (noting that with a proportioned tax, "a state with one-tenth
of the national population" would have to "bear, in the aggregate, one-tenth of the total liability for any
direct tax, regardless of how the tax base is distributed across the country").
477 Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 13 (1916).
478 Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 516 (1899) (upholding tax on sale of commodities at a board of
trade); see also id. at 519 (holding a tax on sales at commodity exchanges was indirect because "in
effect" imposed "a duty or excise laid upon the privilege, opportunity, or facility offered at boards of
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In Veazie Bank v. Fenno, Chief Justice Chase wrote in the course of
holding that a tax on bank notes was indirect, that even though the taxing
power may be "may be exercised oppressively upon persons, . . . the
responsibility of the Legislature is not to the courts, but to the people by
whom its members are elected., 479  The American public may not
understand the distinction between direct and indirect taxes, but the people
have not been shy about opposing new taxes, whatever they are called.
These are the people paying the tax bills, not the members of the
Constitutional Convention.
V. CONCLUSION: NOT ALL SLIPPERY SLOPES ARE ALIKE
All of the constitutional attacks against the ACA mandate in the
current litigation and commentaries rely on slippery slope reasoning. In
law, a slippery slope argument claims that a proposed rule or the resolution
of a lawsuit would inevitably lead to or at least risk results inconsistent
with other established laws or values. In the case of the ACA mandate, the
claim is that granting Congress power under the Commerce Clause to order
people to buy health insurance would allow it to command every American
to buy most any product or service. Similarly, those asserting that the
"shared responsibility" assessment is not a valid tax-either because it is a
penalty or an unapportioned direct tax-assert that if the law were upheld
as a tax it would permit Congress to regulate most anything under the guise
of a tax.
Not all slippery slopes are alike, nor are they equally risky. To the
contrary, some amount of slipperiness may be desirable in both real slopes
and rules. A slippery slope is best for rolling timber down a hill or a
delight for children tumbling on a summer afternoon. In law, slipperiness
may simply signify flexibility-the ability to adapt to changed
circumstances. For example, Chief Justice Warren declared in Brown v.
Board of Education that "we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the
Amendment was adopted. ... ,480 The Court later explained the thinking
behind this conclusion: "Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for
purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change. ''481 That paved the
way for the Court to strike down a poll tax, even though it had previously
upheld such extractions, and notwithstanding that "[p]roperty
qualifications and poll taxes ha[d] been a traditional part of our political
trade or exchanges for the transaction of the business mentioned in the act. It is not a tax upon the
business itself which is so transacted.").
479 75 U.S. 533, 548 (1869); see also Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 594 (1880) ("If the
laws here in question involved any wrong or unnecessary harshness, it was for Congress, or the people
who make congresses, to see that the evil was corrected."); supra note 203.
480 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954).
481 Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966).
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structure."482  The same can be said of substantive due process rights,
which must be "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as
to be ranked as fundamental.A 83 Judges, however, have sharply differed in
interpreting those historical roots. As the Court has recognized, the
"guideposts for responsible decision-making in this unchartered area are
scarce and open-ended." 484 The sheer chronicle of historical events is not
what guides the Court in deciding whether to recognize due process rights.
Rather, it is "reasoned judgment" about the past.485 And as Justice Scalia
has warned, the historical guideposts are "omnidirectional," and "reasoned
judgment" can devolve into "picking the rights we want to protect and
discarding those we do not.
'4 86
Some constitutional doctrines explicitly incorporate indeterminacy.
Procedural due process claims are assessed according to an "intensely
practical" 487 inquiry that involves "a careful weighing of the respective
interests' 488 of the parties and the larger society.489  "Due process is
flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands.' 490 That flexibility comes at the expense of split decisions and
overruling of precedents as different judges assess the relative weights.49'
In every one of these instances, the constitutional doctrine is
sufficiently malleable that a judge bent on reaching a certain outcome
could contrive a rationalization. Yet that possibility can be found to
varying degrees in most any constitutional setting. For example, at least
theoretically, the literal words of the Equal Protection Clause could be
stretched by judicial ideologues to require the equalization of wealth in the
country or mandatory public funding of elections. But one can hardly
imagine more unlikely prospects. Even if the meaning of equal protection
changes, that does not entail that there are no constraints on its
development. Whether a classification violates the Equal Protection
Clause depends on the legitimacy of governmental purpose, and attitudes
482 Id. at 684 (Black, J., dissenting); see also Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 281 (1937)
("Levy by the poll has long been a familiar form of taxation, much used in... in the colonies and later
in the states."), overruled by Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
483 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993) (internal quotations omitted).
484 Dist. Attorney's Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 72 (2009) (internal
quotations omitted).
485 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992).
486 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3052 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
487 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578 (1975).
488 Comm'r Internal Revenue v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614, 630 n.12 (1976).
489 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339-49 (1976) (applying balancing test to determine
whether due process required a full hearing before the termination of federal disability benefits).
490 Id. at 334 (internal quotations omitted).
491 See, e.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43 (1993) (exemplifying a
Court that was sharply divided on requirements of due process in property forfeiture cases); Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986) (overruling in part, Parrott v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), on
procedural rights of prisoners claiming negligent injury by guards).
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about that are subject to change, both among judges and the public. They
are hardly likely to outpace society by much. Likewise, the Court's
approach to substantive due process questions in the period after 1937 has
been far more cautious than expansive.
In law, some slippery slopes present greater dangers to the liberty of
the people than others. In general, those that occur in constitutional
interpretation pose greater threats than in statutory construction. The
people can correct flaws in statutes far more easily than they can overcome
constitutional interpretations not to their liking. "By extending constitu-
tional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a great
extent, place the matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative
action. For that reason, the Court "exercise[s] the utmost care" when
overturning a statute on substantive due process grounds.493 Moreover,
among constitutional doctrines, some are more susceptible to judicial abuse
than others. When assessing whether Congress has power under Article I
to enact regulatory legislation or to impose a certain tax, the Court has two
choices. By upholding the statute, the Court defers to a body that has some
accountability to the people. If it strikes a law as beyond Congress' power,
however, the Court frustrates the will of the people as expressed through
their representatives. If the Court invalidates the health insurance mandate
as exceeding congressional powers, the option will be unavailable for the
foreseeable future.
In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, Justice Story observed that it was
"always a doubtful course, to argue against the use or existence of a power,
from the possibility of its abuse. It is still more difficult, by such an
argument, to ingraft upon a general power a restriction which is not to be
found in the terms in which it is given. ' 494 Story meant that "[firom the
very nature of things, the absolute right of decision, in the last resort, must
rest somewhere-wherever it may be vested it is susceptible of abuse. ' 495
Madison had asserted much the same in Federalist No. 41, that "in every
political institution, a power to advance the public happiness involves a
discretion which may be misapplied and abused., 496  Justice Story
paraphrased Madison's remark in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, albeit without
attribution.497 In Federalist No. 63, Madison emphasized that that the
structure of the Constitution would prevent congressional power from
abuse. Liberty could only be endangered if both houses of Congress were
"corrupt," along with the "state legislatures" that choose Senators, and
492 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (internal quotations omitted).
493 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
494 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 344-45 (1816).
491 Id. at 345.
496 THE FEDERALIST No. 41, supra note 398, at 269 (James Madison).
497 See Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 344-45.
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"finally... the people at large.'" 98
Consider the power to tax, borrow, and spend. The open-ended fiscal
powers granted to Congress in Article I theoretically offer endless possibil-
ities for exploitation. Yet Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 36 that "[t]he
abuse of this power of taxation seems to have been provided against with
guarded circumspection." 499 He listed only two devices: the provisions for
apportionment of direct taxes and uniformity of duties, imposts, and
excises. 500 In McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall said: "The
only security against the abuse of [the] power [to tax], is found in the
structure of the government itself. In imposing a tax, the legislature acts
upon its constituents. This is, in general, a sufficient security against
erroneous and oppressive taxation."501  Politics, not litigation, was
supposed to be the solution to oppressive taxes and excessive regulation.
Opponents of the mandate argue that it is not like any other tax or
regulation precisely because Congress has placed the burden of reforming
the health care system on a relatively few, thus defeating the safeguard that
Marshall emphasized. Moreover, they maintain that is unfair to do so
because those bearing the brunt have done nothing to deserve the liability
other than exercise one of a "citizens' most fundamental liberties, . . . the
power of choosing the private parties whom they will transfer property to
or contract with. ' 02 Invoking a principle from tort law, critics assert that
the "regulation elides the 'deeply rooted' 'difference . . . between
'misfeasance' and 'nonfeasance'-[i.e.,] between [an individual's] active
misconduct working positive injury to others' and his passive 'failure to
take steps to protect them from harm."'5 3  "Historically, one is not




Consequently, to them it amounts to nothing more than "tak[ing] property
from A. and giv[ing] it to B ....
This criticism rests on a particular view of liberty and constitutional
purpose, and ultimately as Holmes wrote in a later-vindicated dissent, "an
79506economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain.
Their view is premised on the competition of individuals in free markets as
the natural ordering of society. Departures from this archetype require
498 THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 398, at 429 (James Madison).
499 THE FEDERALIST NO. 36, supra note 398, at 226 (Alexander Hamilton).
50o Id.
501 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 428 (1819).
502 Brief for Private Respondents, supra note 191, at 61.
503 Id. at 13 (quoting PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56 (5th ed. 1984)).
504 Barnett, supra note 96, at 606.
505 Brief for Private Respondents, supra note 191, at 13 (internal quotations omitted).
506 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also e.g., Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861 (1992) (noting that "the theory
of laissez-faire" that Holmes identified as the basis for Lochner had been repudiated by later cases,
starting with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)).
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justification. That makes sense-even if it is arguable-in depicting the
foundation of tort and contract law, where the issue is determining liability
among individuals. But constitutional law has an entirely different purpose
and foundation, at least by modem understanding. Regulation and taxation
are used to solve social problems affecting the people as a whole. Their
purpose is not necessarily to allocate responsibility among individuals for
injuries, although that at times may be an objective. One's susceptibility to
a tax or regulation need not be based on the person having done something
to deserve a tax or regulatory burden. Rather, the question is whether the
imposition is for the good for the general welfare. In general, individuals
cannot object that they are paying more than their fair share in taxes and
regulatory compliance. There is no objective measure of what is fair in
this regard. Instead, a person has been treated fairly when liability
conforms to a law with a legitimate public purpose. In extreme instances,
which rarely occur, an imposition may be so arbitrary and excessive that it
violates the Equal Protection Clause or the Due Process Clause. °7 There is
an important reason why the Court since 1937 has decided these questions
with great deference toward legislative judgment: it does "not sit as a
super-legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation nor to decide whether
the policy which it expresses offends the public welfare.
' 508
Even if critics of the mandate were correct that taxation and regulation
must be correlated to personal behavior, this Article has shown that it is
equitable to require individuals to obtain insurance to the extent of their
personal ability. As Madison wrote in Federalist No. 63, "liberty may be
endangered by the abuses of liberty as well as by the abuses of power;...
and that the former, rather than the latter, are apparently most to be
apprehended by the United States.' 509 In the health care system that now
exists in the United States, the liberty to be uninsured has pernicious
consequences for others. Whether the new approach taken by Congress
succeeds in addressing one of the most momentous social and economic
problems ever to confront the country remains to be seen. But lawyers and
judges should not trouble themselves with the issue, except in their
capacity as citizens who vote.
507 See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) (punitive
damage award "was an irrational and arbitrary deprivation of the property of the defendant");
Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster Cty., 488 U.S. 226, 344 (1989) (property tax assessment
system that was "arbitrary" violated equal protection).
'0' Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952).
509 THE FEDERALIST No. 63, supra note 398, at 428 (James Madison).
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